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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the effect of nursing staff’s redundant work routines on er-
ror and quality of care in one Critical Access Hospital in rural Wisconsin, USA.
Methods were based on participatory design and an ethnographic approach, and
included individual interviews and observation-based interviews. Introduction of
a computerized information system was scheduled for the case study site and this
thesis makes pre-implementation suggestions regarding staff training, interface
features desired by the future users, and removal or restructuring of certain re-
dundancies. The contribution of this thesis to information systems research is a
classification system for determining the degree of redundancy (productive, gray-
zone, and unproductive) present in the task chains of specific work routines, and a
second classification system for determining to what extent modifying or remov-
ing an unproductive redundancy returns value. The degree to which an unproduc-
tive redundancy may be modified or removed is weighted against the difficulty
of changing the work routines associated with that redundancy as well as the ex-
pected impact on other routines.
Preface
Before earning a B.S. from NTNU and starting on an M.S. and this project, I earned
a B.A. in psychology and history, as well as a teaching degree from Columbia
University in New York City, USA. My motivation to study information systems
has therefore sprung from interdisciplinary interests connected to the way people
communicate, as well as processes related to development and learning. Studying
information flow and how to best educate employees when their routine work
changes appealed to my personal interests and provided an opportunity to apply
interdisciplinary knowledge to an information systems study.
I’ve seen as well as personally experienced both effective and ineffective work
routines in several hospitals including especially the processes related to infor-
mation transfer. In particular, the summer prior to starting my thesis project, I
worked in the main office at a Norwegian psychiatric clinic. Because of my cen-
tral placement and direct involvement with patient journals, I witnessed both ver-
bal and written examples of information transfer, some of which was productive,
and some of which was garbled or otherwise unproductive. These various experi-
ences sharpened a desire to apply my interdisciplinary background to information
systems and particularly health informatics.
Though my primary interest is health informatics, problems related to complex
work routines and communication channels are evident in most work places. This
project is therefore applicable to non-healthcare environments and many of the
problems discussed can be generalized to everyday issues in other professions.
Because of the importance of understanding written and verbal “shorthand,” and
as a native English speaker interested in studying communication behaviors in a
hospital, there were many compelling reasons for me to conduct my case study
research in an English environment. By doing so, I minimized the chance of
miscommunication due to language differences. Of course, people use language
differently and a common native language is no assurance against miscommunica-
tion. In fact, I found that the often hectic setting at my case study hospital, and the
use of profession-specific terminology by the nursing staff, made it difficult to al-
ways be sure that, what I thought I’d understood, was actually what was intended.
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In these cases, it was necessary to ask for confirmation or clarification.
I had the freedom to formulate the specifics of my project according to what I
considered the most productive path to the goal of reorganization and increased
productivity. My case study allowed me to not only map out those hospital’s work
routines on which I chose to focus, but also provided a dynamic behavioral and
educational study. For me, the independence and ability to control the direction
of my project and to develop and answer questions was very satisfying.
Finally, I would like to thank my academic advisor, Professor Eric Monteiro; with
his guidance I learned a great deal about generalizing knowledge and had a thor-
ough sounding board for discussions about organization of my thesis as well as
organization of my field work. I have grown in my ability to think out-of-the-box
and have received good feedback about how to apply my strengths and work on
my weaknesses in future ventures. Considering that I had long US stays during
this past year, I would also like to thank my family for their enthusiasm, support,
and flexibility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It was in the early 1990s that research on medical error prevention first began to
be a focused effort. Then in 1999, a scathing Institute of Medicine (IOM) report
led to a US Presidential Order which called for improvement in healthcare quality
and patient safety. The Presidential Order called for recommendations from the
Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, established in 1998 by President
Clinton (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000b). Standardization
and computerization of information systems (IS) are often considered means by
which to limit error and inefficiency in healthcare, as well as tools for restructuring
existing information systems. Indeed, starting in the 1980s, the healthcare indus-
try began to become increasingly computerized, though two decades later, there
is still no industry IT standardization. Stead, Kelly, and Kolodner (2005, p. 116)
explain that “software applications often become a bottleneck in a health care or-
ganization trying to rapidly improve its processes.” And referring to findings by
the independent research group The Standish Group International, Inc. (1999),
they explain that most software projects across all industries exceed their budget
and estimated delivery date. According to The Standish Group International, Inc.
(1999, p. 2) classification of projects as successful, failed, or challenged in 1998,
only 26% of projects succeeded within the preset terms of the project while 28%
failed and 46% were challenged, meaning that features may have been removed
and costs and time until delivery were inflated. Information system project failures
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and challenges occur across a range of industries where healthcare is but one ex-
ample of the many fields in which reorganized, computerized information systems
may improve quality and reduce error. Within the scope of healthcare, the case
studied in this thesis is a specific instance from a specific location and time, and
the general problems and solutions resemble those encountered in specific studies
undertaken in other industries. Many companies across almost all industries face
the need to reorganize if they want to remain competitive and productive. How-
ever, the process of reorganization is full of potential pitfalls which may typically
involve an unreliable and long timeline, changing entrenched work routines and
dealing with employee resistance. Goals of reorganization tend to vary around
improving quality and minimizing inefficiency while maximizing efficiency.
In addition to an often unreliable timeline, when the decision is made to restruc-
ture an existing information system—whether that information system is paper-
based or computerized—or to adopt a new information system within a given
industry and in this case, a given healthcare facility, new debates and challenges
emerge. These range from how to best re-educate employees on how to restructure
work routines such that adoption of the new system represents an improvement
rather than merely a change. Before steps may be taken to reduce inefficiencies
and error within any field, it is necessary to identify human and IS shortcomings
and how these interrelate. An often contributing and important factor is that the
underlying paper information system is rife with problems which ought to be ad-
dressed prior to implementation, but which are instead expected to be fixed by a
new system. The obvious error in this approach is nicely summarized by Bemmel
and Musen (1997, p. 331) who write, “Computers are a means to an end and not
an end in themselves.”
A second and closely related error is to assume that imposing higher level struc-
turing via an IT system will necessarily improve the relevancy (Ash, Berg, and
Coiera, 2004, p. 106) and quality of that which is shared. Finally, from recog-
nized academic literature and case study descriptions, the importance and influ-
ence of social factors upon the technical—and vice versa—becomes evident; from
literacy, competence, and professionalism to institutional resources and support
mechanisms, social factors significantly affect and stand to alter the course of
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events involved in IS implementation.
What this paper hopes to contribute to IS studies is—in the context of a case
study—identification of inefficiencies and patterns of redundancy and opportu-
nity for error within healthcare due to the human component, the information
system, and the interplay between the two. In particular, this research focuses
on the human component, not only that which is successful in reorganization and
implementation of new systems but what doesn’t work as well or at all. Integral
questions include:
• What are the inefficiencies of the current work routines?
• Where does the risk of human-related errors seem likeliest in the current
work routines and how might this risk be reduced?
• How does the human factor affect the process of reorganization, and what
is necessary to encourage and aid employees during the shift?
These questions will each be addressed three times, once in each of the following
three main parts of the thesis:
• Part I is a literature-based discussion of the coordination of the human com-
ponent and working routines in information systems and of medical stan-
dardization and the potential for error;
• Part II introduces relevant case study examples and details concerning the
human component, the existing information system at the case study hospi-
tal, and work routines; and finally,
• Part III uses literature and case study examples to address work routines and
the potential for error due to interplay between the human component and
information systems.
3
Part I
Theory and Literature Review
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Chapter 2
Western Healthcare
Canada and most European countries have national, socialized healthcare systems
as well as varying levels of available, privatized medical services. In contrast, the
US is mostly privatized with a more limited socialized sector serving mainly low-
income and elderly persons. Despite international differences, standardization
and IT development in healthcare are shared international challenges. European
use of electronic patient records in general practitioner offices is one of the best
in the world (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 345). Standardized messages for
communication between hospitals and general practitioners was pioneered in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the 1980s and has since spread through-
out much of Europe with particular success in Scandinavia (Voss, Heimly, and
Sjo¨gren, 2005). For example, the Swedish national health care network (Sjunet)
was started in 1998; it makes possible the consultation of specialists from around
the country. A cost-benefit study indicated that Sjunet has resulted in great sav-
ings for both the national healthcare system and the patients (Voss et al., 2005).
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway have a history of cross-national healthcare col-
laboration. They are currently involved in a project with one hospital in Estonia
and another in Lithuania which is intended to further facilitate international com-
munication by learning more about what obstacles exist and how to overcome
them (Voss et al., 2005). Despite differing economic principles governing health-
care between European and North American countries, providing equal access to
5
healthcare, as well as a need to improve quality while simultaneously cutting costs
and improving efficiency, has resulted in similar trends and research interests with
particular focus on standardization and health informatics. Given the context in
which this thesis is written—a study of a US healthcare institution conducted by
a student in Norway—it is useful to provide a brief orientation to the similarities
and dissimilarities between Norway and the US.
2.1 Demographics
Demographic considerations are a significant factor in healthcare and are there-
fore a worthwhile comparison point between Norway and the US. As of July 2006,
the estimated Norwegian population will be 4,610,820 million and the estimated
US population will be 298,444,215 million (CIA, 2006). Excepting the Western
United States, a higher percentage of the US population lives in metropolitan
rather than non-metropolitan areas (US Census Bureau, 2003, chap. 2). The US
Census Bureau (Sevetson, 2002, p. 7) defines urban as “all territory, population,
and housing units located within urbanized areas and urban clusters;” both urban-
ized areas and urban clusters consist of a “geographic core of block groups or
blocks [that] must have a population density of at least 1,000 people per square
mile, and adjacent block groups and blocks with at least 500 people per square
mile” where urbanized areas have a population of at least 50,000 people and ur-
ban areas have at least 2,500 people and fewer than 50,000. Even though the
metropolitan population predominates over the rural population in the US, both
Norway and the US have a sprawling rural population for whom equal access is
necessary.
According to The National Advisory Committee on Rural Health and Human Ser-
vices (2006, p. 11), the number of pharmacists in the US is disproportionately low
for rural compared to urban areas. Skilled nursing care for the elderly is insuffi-
cient in rural areas and provides another example of disproportionate availability
of services in urban versus rural areas (The National Advisory Committee on Ru-
ral Health and Human Services, 2006, p. 13). These examples exemplify one sig-
6
nificant threat to rural healthcare. The relatively small size of the populations and
the often lower pecentage of famililies with health insurance mean that healthcare
access in rural areas is not equal to healthcare access in urban areas (The Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Rural Health and Human Services, 2006, p. 11).
Considering that perceived access to healthcare is reported to affect health in a
community (Kozak, Hall, and Owings, 2001, p. 225), the closing of pharmacies
and other healthcare providers in rural areas poses a threat to healthcare access and
therefore to community health. Rural healthcare advocacy groups are intended to
protect the survival and quality standards of the non-urban hospital; state and lo-
cal health care representatives identify “access to quality health services” as a top
rural healthcare priority (The National Advisory Committee on Rural Health and
Human Services, 2006, p. 13). The Rural Wisconsin Health Cooperative (RWHC)
is one example of a rural healthcare advocacy group. The RWHC is owned and run
by twenty-nine rural, acute care hospitals, has received federal grants to realize
model initiatives, and according to their website, is nationally recognized as one
of the best models for networking rural hospitals (Rural Wisconsin Health Co-
operative, 2004). Implicit in its name, the RWHC has a particular focus on local
care and in particular the positive effect of local healthcare on the local econ-
omy. Moreover, the RWHC focuses on Medicare and health insurance equity, and
quality management (Rural Wisconsin Health Cooperative, 2004). The Small Ru-
ral Hospital Improvement (SHIP) grant program awards funds to eligible small,
rural hospital applicants; SHIP grant funds are intended to be used toward pay-
ment systems’ costs, health insurance equity, and to help “reduce medical errors
and support quality improvement” (Rural Health Resource Center, 2005, p. 4).
In Wisconsin in 2002, the State Office of Rural Health partnered with the RWHC
to meet the goal of encouraging small rural hospitals to use their SHIP funds to-
ward improving IT infrastructure via use of the RWHC Wide Area Network (Rural
Health Resource Center, 2005, p. 15). Telemedicine is an appealing solution to the
challenge of providing equal access to health services in rural areas in Europe and
North America (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 341). In particular, emergency
patients in rural areas may benefit from telemedicine as it can reduce unneces-
sary and potentially dangerous transportation of injured patients (Bergstrøm and
Heimly, 2004, p. 343). The National Advisory Committee on Rural Health and
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Human Services (2006, p. 12) asserts that via use of health information technol-
ogy, rural communities might be able improve healthcare quality and public health
via “disease surveillance and targeted health education.”
2.2 Healthcare Quality
In 2005, the University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute found that the
most important determinants of health status are: “health behaviors (40% of de-
terminants); socioeconomic factors (40% of determinants); physical environment
(10% of determinants); and access to healthcare (10% of determinants)” (Zank,
Kaufman, Peppard, Remington, and Kindig, 2005, p. 3). The determinants are not
mutually exclusive and reducing one will likely affect others as well. For example,
lower socioeconomic groups tend to have higher rates of smoking, higher fat and
added sugar diets, higher alcohol use, and less physical activity (Kim, Symons,
and Popkin, 2004, pp. 184, 190). Though the health determinants are not mu-
tually exclusive, it is true that financial status is not a factor in Norway while it
may be one in the United States. EMTALA is a US federally mandated law that
states that any hospital which receives federal payments must provide treatment
before requesting payment information from any person entering the emergency
room. Someone can visit the emergency room for any health problem even if that
problem would be more appropriately handled by a general practitioner. Some
treatments, and particularly those required by law, may be attained at free clin-
ics; for instance, US children and teachers may not start school without proof of
vaccination which they may receive at free clinics. Despite the fact that unin-
sured persons can still receive needed medical treatment, health insurance often
does promote improved health status because of well-care and prevention activi-
ties. US healthcare coverage is funded via any constellation of private pay, private
health insurance, and/or government health insurance. A breakdown of insurance
coverage is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Reasons for being uninsured may be due to low socioeconomic status (30% of
those considered poor had no health insurance (US Census Bureau, 2003, chap. 15)),
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Private (68%)
Private/government overlap
Government (27%)
Uninsured (16%)
Figure 2.1: Breakdown of Insurance Coverage (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2005, p. 19)
being an illegal alien, or being caught in a gap such that they earn too much to be
eligible for Medicaid, but choose not to or are unable to afford private insurance.
Given the country-wide importance of a healthy population, it is wise to reduce
the percentage of uninsured. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (1996), known as HIPAA, is one influential response with the stated
purpose “to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the
group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insur-
ance and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to
improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the adminis-
tration of health insurance, and for other purposes.” According to the CMS, HIPAA
may lower one’s risk of losing existing insurance coverage, simplify switching
of health plans and/or help an employee purchase new insurance if the employee
loses employer coverage and has none other available. Additionally, HIPAA has
significant ramifications for IS and IT in implementing new systems as well as in
facilities where these systems already exist. This is due to the fact that HIPAA
mandates improved security and therefore the need to reevaluate established prac-
tices such as walking away from a computer where one is logged on and in the
process of viewing patient data. To clarify, HIPAA is a change agent working on
behalf of standardization and quality improvement within the medical profession.
As with HIPAA, one aim of healthcare policies and research is to improve health-
care quality. The US government agencies responsible for healthcare policy and
research fall under the US Department of Health and Human Services, and in-
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Figure 2.2: Breakdown of Health Care Funding (Centers for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services, 2005b)
clude the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). To healthcare providers, the per-
centage of total cost paid by various sources is of less importance than the total
percentage of people receiving needed preventive to emergency care. For this rea-
son, care and quality assurance have fallen under government regulations aimed
at reducing the number of uninsured. Figure 2.2 gives an overview of financial
allocations from the public and private sectors for healthcare.
In 2004, Norwegian healthcare spending represented about 35% of the country’s
annual budget (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 337). Norway has a low popula-
tion density, falling birth rates, and increasing life expectancy; given that the av-
erage age is increasing, Norwegian healthcare will face the increasingly common
international problem of having to improve services for a more demanding, aging
population while simultaneously cutting costs due to a reduction in the number of
eligible workers (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 346). In Norway today, the ratio
of working age people (20–67 years) to elderly (older than 67 years) is 5:1 and in
2050 it is predicted that this ratio will be 2.5:1 (Hygen, 2005). If current national
healthcare is to be maintained or improved, it is imperative that the annual health-
care budget not be raised beyond that which is maintainable by the future working
age population. Improving efficiency is often one way of cutting costs and may be
one of the strongest arguments for IT development in healthcare (Bergstrøm and
Heimly, 2004, p. 347). If national healthcare is not improved, healthcare quality
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may either be degraded or socialized healthcare will not be sustainable.
Similar threats to quality care and needed improvements in efficiency exist in both
Norway and the United States. Due to the national healthcare system in Norway,
socioeconomic factors logically play a smaller role than in the United States, but
access to healthcare is a potential area in which the level of Norwegian health
may be reduced. In fact, Norway’s relatively small population and barriers in the
natural terrain mean that the greatest current medical challenge in Norway is low
population density (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 337). Eighty-five hospitals
serve the approximately 4.6 million population and, therefore, many must travel
long distances for certain types of medical care (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004,
p. 337). In the United States, one means of improving rural healthcare access
while maintaining requirements for efficiency and fiscal responsibility is the abil-
ity of hospitals to seek Critical Access Hospital (CAH) status. According to the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2005a, p. 2), Medicare pays CAHs
101% of the “allowable and reasonable costs” incurred for most services rendered
to Medicare beneficiaries. Rigorous criteria limit the pool of eligible hospitals.
Specifically, under the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997, in order for a
hospital to receive the CAH designation it must be more than thirty-five miles from
any other hospital or, in the case of mountainous terrain or only secondary roads,
it must be fifteen miles from another hospital, or it must be certified by the state
to be a “necessary provider” (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2005a,
p. 1). Additionally, a CAH must be in a rural area in a state that has the “State Flex
Program,” must have twenty-five or fewer beds, must have an average length of
stay equal to or less than ninety-six hours, and must provide 24-hour emergency
services (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2005a, p. 1). Meeting these
criteria does not mean that a hospital is automatically deemed a CAH; given the
benefits involved, any applicable hospital must apply to receive CAH status. The
focus of a CAH should be community need.
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2.3 Health Informatics
While there are regions in the United States that interconnect and take advantage
of telemedicine, the health networks in the US tend to be relatively small and
there is no current national health IT network standard. In contrast, Norwegian
healthcare is far more standardized and interconnected and represents an ongoing
and bottom-up effort developed over a fifteen year period (Hygen, 2005).
Norwegian healthcare is divided into five regional health nets (Hygen, 2005). This
technical infrastructure indicates a high level of and devotion to health informat-
ics in Norway. Continuing to promote health informatics in Norway is considered
one means of increasing efficiency. This dedication to promoting health informat-
ics is evident through the formation of various national research centers such as
The Norwegian Center for Health Informatics (KITH), The Norwegian Center for
Telemedicine (NST), and The Norwegian Center for Electronic Patient Journals
(NSEP) (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 338). In addition, the E-Norway plan
is a government plan outlining goals for private and public sector IT development
(Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 337). In 2001 an electronic patient journal stan-
dard was released in Norway (Bergstrøm and Heimly, 2004, p. 344). Nearly 100%
of general practitioners have electronic patient journals and 80% of hospitals have
them, though the estimates for system use vary substantially and some systems
seem to parallel rather than replace paper-based work routines (Bergstrøm and
Heimly, 2004, p. 345). Even so, the mere availability is far higher than the US
estimates. One advantage of such coordination in care is an ability for patients to
become more involved in their treatment, which is believed to be a precursor to
improved quality of care (Hygen, 2005). Regarding efficiency and quality of care,
Voss et al. (2005) write that, “The objective with the Norwegian National Health
Network is to contribute to high quality and coherent health and social services,
by being a sector network for effective cooperation between the different service
sections in the sector.”
Despite the lack of a national healthcare network in the US, there are multiple
small networks scattered across the country and these have developed different
standards. As in Norway, there is a similar belief that efficiency will be increased
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via greater use of health informatics and there are also US organizations for whom
a goal is the promotion of health informatics: recall the aim of the RWHC to cre-
ate a network among some subset of its twenty-nine member hospitals. Other
examples of indirect healthcare networking are agreements between competing
institutions that are forged solely because of federal mandates and/or concern for
improving care quality across a region. For example, one aspect of the CAH agree-
ment for CAHs in the region around LaCrosse, Wisconsin is a provision for use
of MedLink AIR to transport patients who cannot be treated at the more limited
Critical Access Hospitals to the better equipped Gundersen Lutheran facility in
La Crosse, Wisconsin; Gundersen Lutheran Medical Center is a large, private
healthcare provider which offers care in 19 counties throughout western Wiscon-
sin, northeastern Iowa, and southeastern Minnesota (Gundersen Lutheran, 2006a).
Since 1992, Gundersen has operated the emergency medical helicopter known as
the MedLink AIR (Gundersen Lutheran, 2006b). Of course, use of the helicopter
is based on medical need, not ability to pay and therefore it is only patients that re-
quire air transport that will be transported by MedLink AIR (Gundersen Lutheran,
2006b). One interviewee at a CAH gave the example of what happens when a heart
attack victim comes into the ER; hospital medical staff have a certain amount of
time to evaluate the patient before MedLink AIR is called and within thirty minutes
the patient is in the air. This is, of course, the idealized situation: if the helicopter
is on another call or the weather is inclement, the patient may have to wait; or if it
is essential to get that patient to a larger facility, the patient may have to be driven.
Seventy percent of the patients transported by MedLink AIR are from all facilities
that lack the resources necessary to care for the given patient; the remaining thirty
percent of patients transported to the La Crosse Gundersen facility are transported
directly from an accident site (Gundersen Lutheran, 2006b).
IT development in healthcare allows for an increase in telemedicine, medical
transportation and accessibility options—particularly for rural residents—and this
suggests that, on the umbrella organization level, a cohesive IT network facilitates
improvement of at least some services. Of course some services may be harmed
by a more standardized, structured IT system, and it is uncertain whether IT de-
velopment translates to improved quality and reduced inefficiency for individual
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healthcare providers. It is therefore useful to identify what inefficiencies exist and
what quality improvement entails.
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Chapter 3
Evaluating Information System
Inefficiencies
Information systems (IS) are those systems—paper and electronic—that help main-
tain order and communication within a work place. Whether informal or formal,
all work places rely on the stability of an established system. Unfortunately,
these systems are far too often overly complicated, with unproductive redudant
processing and poorly designed routines. Inefficient systems may be improved
via a reengineering process wherein work processes are evaluated, possibly re-
designed, and then formalized into standard sequences. This process of evalu-
tion ought to examine even the most intricate details of work coordation within
the organization and will henceforth be called “articulation work” (Gasser, 1986,
p. 211). Following re-design, many posit that the formalization of routines in a
previously paper-based system may be aided by introduction of a computer-based
IS. Some IS researchers have, however, been less optimistic and identify com-
pelling challenges. An understanding of the process of observation and re-design
may be aided by research from the fields of participatory design, ethnographic
study, and Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW).
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3.1 The Human Component
Referring to CSCW, Gasser (1986, p. 208) discusses the distinction between “pri-
mary work” and computing work, which “presumes the existence” of the so-called
primary work. This primary work is separated into tasks, each of which are the
responsibility of an individual or group within the organization (Gasser, 1986,
p. 209). When these tasks are merged, a productive whole emerges. Hence, for
the productivity of the organization, the individual human tasks must be properly
carried out and must not be in conflict with one another. Coordination relies on
the commitment of individuals in fulfilling their subtasks (Gasser, 1986, p. 210).
Gasser (1986, p. 210) refers to this collection of subtasks as the “task chain”.
When evaluating work production, it is therefore logical to identify the underly-
ing task chain, and having done so, to identify unnecessary or redudant links. This
is an early practical step in the process of computerizing an information system.
This, however, overlooks the human social and emotional attributes that affect
commitment to and cooperative completion of the task chain. Furthermore, any
task chain will likely intersect with other task chains, which together compose
the organizational web, what (Gasser, 1986, p. 210) refers to as the “production
lattice”, and that which helps maintain productive stability.
The network of employees and their organizational systems creates the “organi-
zational form” of the organization itself (Bowers, 1994, p. 288). Bowers (1994,
p. 288) further clarifies that the organizational form refers to the sum of organiza-
tional systems within a company, and explains that organizational form will affect
whether or not a new technology is accepted or rejected. The coordination of
the human and computer subtasks within this organizational form or production
lattice may be described by actor-network theory. This theory defines the rela-
tionship of technology and socially hierarched human and nonhuman daily-life
objects (i.e., the network of actors) (Akrich, 1992, p. 206). In this network, actors
and technologies reciprocally define one another (Akrich, 1992, p. 222). Both the
object and the actor network must be constantly flexible (Akrich, 1992, p. 206).
In this “reciprocal [script] adjustment”, technical objects establish roles and shape
actant relationships and actants may also re-shape technical objects (Akrich, 1992,
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p. 206).
The British socio-technical approach neatly addresses the issue of actor-network
theory and the way that various organizational roles interact to form a unified
whole. Sociologists and technologists define two extremes for describing the re-
lationship, or script, between a technology and its surrounding society (network
of users). These two extremes are social constructivism and technological deter-
minism. These two extremes mutually exclude the simultaneous success of both
technology and social need. Akrich (1992, p. 208) presents the conflict as a need
to merge the physical script of the technical object with the socio-technical script,
which refers to the persons or contexts in which the technical object is to serve in
society. She explains, “Thus many of the choices made by designers can be seen
as decisions about what should be delegated to a machine and what should be left
to the initiative of human actors. In this way the designer expresses the scenario of
the device in question—the script out of which the future history of the object will
develop” (Akrich, 1992, p. 216). A self-evident part of the argument for a bal-
anced script, or a socio-technical script, is that it is human beings who conceive
technological ideas; new technological ideas are framed by human context and
human design. Even if a technological design is conceived only physically and
without active consideration for likely social reaction, the technology still exists
in a human context. Therefore, it logically follows that social constructivism must
play some role in the interaction of technology and its human actor network. Sim-
ilarly, there are abundant examples of how technological determinism influences
the relationship between technology and the actor network; for example, consider
the wife in a family where the husband spends so much time in front of the family
computer that the wife psychologically pushes away any desire to interact with the
computer (Aune, 1992, p. 97). Yet, over time, this same wife may be nonetheless
drawn to the computer because of the benefits of using a word processor. How
the computer shapes the home and is pro-actively shaped by the home user can be
viewed in terms of what may be called domestication.
Similar to the socio-technical approach in its emphasis on the human component,
Scandinavian participatory design aims at achieving an “industrial democracy”
(Ehn, 1993, p. 48) via an emphasis on the entire system—technical and human
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components. Participatory design draws on tools from and is heavily influenced
by many of the same principles as the socio-technical school of thought, but Ehn
(1993, pp. 48,50) and others posit that participatory design is better suited to the
“democratization” of systems. Ehn (1993, p. 74) emphasizes the use of “play-
ful activity” in participatory design as a means to make users engage in design
activity. Further, encouragement of developer and user participation helps high-
light needed IS attributes, as well as potential product shortcomings. A keen,
observant developer may amass information about user weaknesses, which may
then be re-designed in the final product to be more user-friendly (actor-friendly)
and situational context-aware (network aware). By including users in the design
process, this seamless incorporation of user needs situated within a contextual
awareness will be made possible prior to implementation rather than recognized
and addressed as an afterthought. Ehn (1993, p. 61) writes of Christiane Floyd’s
opinion of the product-oriented view of designing computer systems that such an
approach “leaves the relationship between programs and the living human world
entirely unexplored, providing no way to check the relevance of the specification
or to accommodate learning and communication.”
Given that the human factor is deemed to be integral to the success of participa-
tory design, utilizing ethnographic study to better understand individual actors,
their tasks, and the context in which they are situated may aid in the paritipatory
design of an IS aimed at supported cooperative work. Researchers using ethno-
graphic study are interested in workers’ actual routines—Gasser’s (1986, p. 210)
task chains—rather than merely their descriptions of them (Schultze, 2000, p. 4).
Suchman (1995, p. 61) writes, “Problems arise, however, when normative repre-
sentations are either generated at a distance from the sites at which the work they
represent goes on or is taken away from those sites and used in place of work-
ing knowledges.” This said, provided data is properly collected, Schultze (2000,
p. 16) describes a process of reflection wherein the researcher records notes and
revisits them following on-site work with the aid of “hindsight, a more holistic
understanding, and a specific theory.” The confessional writing style is therefore
a good tool to employ in an ethnographic study. It is an uncommon approach and
requires suspension of one’s own preconceived ideas in favor of allowing the sit-
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uation to provide insights (Schultze, 2000, p. 7). Additionally, it is important that
the ethnographer provide revealing personal accounts, such as age, gender, and
personal opinions about introduction of a new system, and views of social and
work related aspects of the current information system, as well as relevant back-
ground information (Schultze, 2000, p. 31). These attributes establish the “fil-
ter” through which the researcher experiences and perceives the world, and which
supports the researcher’s “cultural critique” of that which is studied (Schultze,
2000, pp. 35–36). While worker routines are integral to an ethnographic study, a
culture of blame should not be advocated (Nordenberg, 2000). Rather, routines
must be viewed as part of the overall system—the integrated human and technical
components—and “preventing future errors is best achieved by designing a safer
overall system” (Nordenberg, 2000).
3.2 Coordinating Routines
Can multiple workers’ routines be organized without an understanding for why
the routines follow the schedules they do? Is it possible to integrate multiple
work processes without first understanding how the processes interrelate and how
they function under the current form of organization? Is Computer Supported
Cooperative Work (CSCW) always an improvement over the paper-based system?
These questions point to a problematic IS theme: common practice indicates that
it is believed that “service fragmentation,” or poorly coordinated work, may be
alleviated via introduction of a “common information infrastructure” (Hartswood,
Procter, Rouncefield, and Slack, 2003, p. 241). The problem with this approach
is that the integration necessary to establish a common information infrastruc-
ture requires identification and understanding of the processes—both formal and
informal—that occur in the workplace. The perhaps most challenging set of pro-
cesses to try to understand and integrate are verbal and non-formalized transac-
tions between workers. Once the non-formalized processes are understood and
included in the puzzle, it becomes possible to re-organize the current system and
in so doing, integrate these easily overlooked processes. Therefore, rather than
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solving problems of poor coordination via information integration, a more logical
approach is to alleviate such coordination or service fragmentation problems via
understanding and re-organization, and only then consider introducing an infor-
mation integration infrastructure to maintain the newly integrated work processes.
Unfortunately, certain examples within CSCW research show that management’s
good intentions often overlook the complexity and potentially negative effects of
attempting to impose managerial control over the task chains and individual actors
within the production lattice. Management too often sees the finished product
without understanding the intricacies of how the various subtasks are coordinated
to achieve that final product. This often results in ambitious management goals
which may in fact create more work for employees without offering any value
return to the individual actors. The actors may in fact resist imposed changes to
the production lattice with the result being “technological failure” (Bowers, 1994,
p. 288).
When technological failures occur, it is likely that the implementation approach
has overlooked critical elements of the working atmosphere, which has in turn
caused actors to be resistant. The overlooked critical elements may be social in
nature and ought to be considered in order to ease the implementation of an ad-
ministratively imposed system. More precisely, technological failure may occur
when a new system helps the bookkeeping, but actually creates additional or “in-
terruptive” (Ash et al., 2004, p. 106) work for those employees who must regularly
interact with the system. Small but important adjustments may be ignored in favor
of grander additions which may in fact serve more to complicate that to improve.
As an example, consider Grudin’s (1988, p. 85) example of an electronic meeting
scheduler and the fact that, while it is a good idea in principle, it requires employ-
ees to keep their appointment books up to date at all times, so that the electronic
meeting scheduler can view these appointment books to find common free time
for meetings, etc. Grudin (1988) argues, “Who would benefit from automatic
meeting scheduling? The person who calls the meeting: in general, a manager
would benefit. But who would have to do additional work to make the application
succeed? The subordinates, who would have to maintain electronic calendars that
they would not otherwise use.” About Grudin’s example, Bowers (1994, p. 287)
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writes, “Grudin argues that, while a manager might see the utility of such an ap-
plication in alleviating the burden of trying to find time when everyone is free,
those who are managed have to do extra work in keeping diaries they might not
otherwise bother with. The discrepancy between who gets the benefit and who
does the (extra) work is one of Grudin’s three problems which can lead to ‘group-
ware failure.’ ” Another example of where a misfit of intention and consequence
may be seen is when electronic medical records’ goals of “consistency, standard-
ization, structure and completeness” interfere with the timeliness requirements of
the medical profession (Hartswood et al., 2003, p. 244). This further raises the
issue that computerized systems may in fact introduce the potential for serious er-
rors of the type that would be caught in a traditional paper-based system, but that
go unnoticed when made by a computer system. While efficiency may be more
important than an occasional error in many fields, errors in certain fields, such as
medicine or flight control, may result in loss of human life and, therefore, ought
to be weighed quite heavily in any discussion about the merit of CSCW.
Implementation of industry-wide IT solutions may create problems similar to
those created on the organization level by over-zealous management imposing
IT systems on unwilling employees. For example, in the article “Mission Crit-
ical: Challenges for Groupware in a Pharmaceutical Company,” Ciborra (1997,
p. 97) assesses the introduction of pharmaceutical groupware applications across
Switzerland as difficult due to the contradicting ideals of “streamlining and cen-
tralization” versus an individual organization’s desire for autonomy. On the orga-
nization level, employees want to maintain their autonomy within the organiza-
tion, whereas on an industry-wide level, managers and CEOs want to do what they
perceive as best for their independent organization. The scale may change, but
the problem remains essentially the same. A solution that fits in one organization
may not fit as well in another, which raises the further question of what level of
standardization is appropriate in a given industry. Pursued without caution, in-
dustry standardization may cause the destruction of individual organizations. And
on the smaller scale, the introduction of a standard within one division of a com-
pany may alienate the uninvolved division(s) and thwart effective company-wide
information sharing and communication. Yet despite this risk, one common im-
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plementation strategy is to prototype for a representative group within an organi-
zation with the intention of then introducing it to the remainder of the organization
after successful implementation with the representative group (Orlikowski, 1992,
p. 369).
This approach allows the researcher to get close to at least one group within the
production lattice, but it also raises the challenge of dealing with human emo-
tion and balancing socio-technical needs. If an actor is entrenched in his job, it
is likely that imposing new rules and controls on that employee will create stress
and reduced effectiveness. Moreover, when employees perceive that their job se-
curity is at risk, they become understandably reluctant to reveal the whole truth
about their working routines when they are asked by an outside investigator, con-
sultant, or researcher. Consequently, the data itself may be seriously compro-
mised by the researcher’s attempts to uncover what weaknesses exist in the task
chains, what shortcuts are typically taken, and what circumventing routines are
commonly used. Therefore, on-site observation is an important research tool that
can help distinguish real work practice routines from an idealistic recounting of
them. “Practice orientation” (Schultze, 2000, p. 4) relies on on-site observation
and encourages the development of an information system that tries to unite ac-
tual practice with necessary practice, rather than developing a system based on
non-practiced idealisms.
In her study of notes implementation, Orlikowski (1992, p. 368) explains that a
technology becomes or does not become valued based on early assessments which
shape the pattern of usage, and thereby success, for the given technology. Having
pointed out that the success of introducing technology aimed at changing orga-
nization practices is dependent on changing “people’s technological frames and
the organization’s work practices,” Orlikowski (1992, p. 368) raises the important
question of how do you “devise a game plan if you have never played the game
before.” A start is to compose an image of the actual work processes in which em-
ployees engage and determine what problems exist in the current organizational
system. Only then is it possible to identify and improve the current organizational
system such that if the organizational system is remapped to an IT system, current
organizational problems will not be transferred in the remapping. Unfortunately,
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as Hartswood et al. (2003, p. 241) explain, “What is often lacking is a proper
understanding of the nature of what inter-service working actually involves and
where the problems lie.”
Clearly, as long as the system remains unmappable to the researcher such that
problems lurk behind a mask of intricate routines, flawlessly coordinating the hu-
man component and the work requirements of the information system will remain
out of reach. It seems that only a bottom-up approach to mapping the established
actor-network and production lattice within an organization will make possible
the understanding necessary to achieve this coordination.
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Chapter 4
Healthcare Quality
4.1 Standardization
The transition of the patient journal has had a long journey from Hippocrates’
influence on the medical record during the fifth century B.C. through the mod-
ern organization of patient data. Hippocrates used the “time-oriented medical
record” wherein medical observations are recorded as they are observed (Bemmel
and Musen, 1997, pp. 99–101). The form by which observations were conducted
changed over the following centuries, but the format for recording findings re-
mained a chronological one. In fact, in 1880 when William Mayo founded the
Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, Mayo doctors recorded medical notes in
chronological order in a binder which they carried and used for all patient evalu-
ations (Bemmel and Musen, 1997, p. 101). It was not until 1907 that the incon-
venience of having individual patient notes interspersed throughout these binders
led to the separation of documents into individual patient files, which is the basis
for today’s “patient-centered medical record” (Bemmel and Musen, 1997, p. 101).
However, despite the improved form, there were no established criteria regarding
content (Bemmel and Musen, 1997, p. 101). This need resulted in a 1920 de-
cision by Mayo management to establish certain minimal criteria; these criteria
established an outline still followed in present-day medical records (Bemmel and
Musen, 1997, p. 101). The next level of patient medical record organization—
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organization within the individual records—was introduced by Weed with his
“problem-oriented medical record,” whereby patient problems were defined by
the “SOAP structure” (Bemmel and Musen, 1997, p. 102). SOAP is an acronym for
subjective (patient complaints), objective (practioner findings), assessment (re-
sults and diagnoses), and plan (strategy regarding treatment of the given ailment)
(Bemmel and Musen, 1997, p. 102). Of course, one potentially unfortunate side
effect of this method is the need for redundant charting—information pertinent
to more than one problem must be classified under each individual relevant prob-
lem (Bemmel and Musen, 1997, p. 102). Indeed, standardized medicine may be a
double-edged sword and there is surprisingly little agreement on the best standard
practice for any particular situation (Ash et al., 2004).
Redundancy is by definition a repetition of something already done and in that
sense, redundant behavior seems explicitly inefficient. However, Cabitza, Sarini,
Simone, and Telaro (2005, p. 158) present two views of redundancy in charting
where one type of redundancy is part of standard, intentional practice and the other
is unintentional and inefficient. Cabitza et al. (2005, p. 158) discriminate between
“back end” and “front end” redundancy; they write, “At the ‘back end,’ redun-
dancy concerns fault tolerance and reliability; therefore it is usually introduced
and maintained. Conversely, at the ‘front end,’ redundancy typically concerns
replication of data or coexistence of correlated data in two or more places.” Re-
dundant, or duplicated, information may in fact make a patient journal easier to
read, as each section is complete and does not require constant cross-referencing.
Duplication in the form of different representations of the same data may improve
the system’s fault tolerance, but it may also “become unsynchronized or incon-
sistent and lead to misconceptions or other human errors” (Cabitza et al., 2005,
p. 160). The role of redundancy in standardized medical routines is therefore
controversial and situation-dependent.
In addition to patient journals, medical standardization may refer to many aspects
of medical care, including radiology, billing and other management information,
diagnoses reporting, and care-plans. While standardizing routines may have un-
fortunate side effects, quality assessments of standardized care often find fewer
errors than in non-standardized care. Numerous examples exist of healthcare or-
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ganizations that have adopted computerized systems, such as patient journal and
registration systems, and subsequently seen a correlated reduction in error and
improvement in care (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000a). Via
IT, the consumer and the provider gain immediate access to important patient
care information. Of course, IT systems are expensive and incentives may not be
clear and compelling. The consumer may gain increased access, but care might
be diminished due to the added effort needed to maintain electronic records. An
additional consideration is that some facilities within a single region may be bet-
ter able to afford the upgrade to a shared regional system. For example, in the
case of the twenty-nine RWHC member hospitals, advantages of a standard system
would be interoperability and the ability to train a rural systems operations task
force, rather than maintaining financial dependency on different vendors. Despite
clear advantages, there are legitimate concerns such as the redundancy that is built
into the SOAP structure’s standardization. According to Ash et al. (2004, p. 106–
109), unintended consequences of information technology in medicine include the
following: an interface that is not suitable for a highly interruptive use context;
cognitive overload; oversimplifying collective, interactive work to seem linear,
clearcut, and predictable; overcompleteness; (system) inflexibility; workarounds;
loss of feedback; and decision support overload.
In a lecture, “Herding Cats? Standardizing Professional Behavior with Evidence-
Based Medicine,” at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Tim-
mermans (2005) addressed care-plan standardization. Though specifically ad-
dressing variance of care across the US, such variance of care and lack of stan-
dardization is common in healthcare systems all over the world. For example, one
issue raised was that some states show unnecessary and longer hospital stays than
others for similar ailments. Average length of care is calculated by adding the
number of days of care and dividing the total by the number of discharges. The
number of “avoidable hospitalizations” in 1998 was calculated at 133.8 out of ev-
ery 10,000, or 11.5% (Kozak et al., 2001, p. 226), with the meaning of “avoidable”
based on whether or not proper ambulatory, preventive, and other care was avail-
able such that patients with certain ailments could avoid hospitalization. Given
that rural healthcare access is disproportionately lower than urban healthcare ac-
26
cess (The National Advisory Committee on Rural Health and Human Services,
2006), it seems evident that keeping skilled medical workers in rural areas, as
well as improving physical and financial access to rural healthcare, are means
by which avoidable rural hospitalizations could be reduced. The number of avoid-
able hospitalizations in the US in 1998 represented a 5.6% increase since 1980, yet
all other types of hospitalizations actually decreased during these eighteen years
(Kozak et al., 2001, p. 226). As an example of state and rural variance in clin-
ical guidelines and therefore in number of hospitalizations, consider that certain
ailments are treated on an out-patient basis in one state, but require a one-night
hospital stay in another state (Bemmel and Musen, 1997, p. 335). Timmerman’s
argument was that, in general, over-utilization of hospital accommodations rep-
resents a larger problem than does under-utilization. Due to variations from one
state to another, from one hospital to another, and even from one practioner to
another within the same hospital, healthcare legislation has different effects on
different hospitals, based on a combination of reasons, among which are hospi-
tal and community culture as well as community socioeconomic status. Though
product specific, the description by Ciborra (1997, p. 119) of failed groupware im-
plementation is applicable to this discussion; Ciborra (1997, p. 119) writes, “[...]
such applications are meeting obstacles in their diffusion, and this is not due to the
technology or to the failure of the application. Rather, it is a combination of cor-
porate inertia, entrenched organizational and cultural feuds and limits to learning
from innovation that seem to be responsible for the slow deployment [...]” This
combination of the social and political as well as the lack of industy standards
make for a tumultuous environment for propogating quality and reducing error.
The extent to which error plagues healthcare was highlighted by a US government
(IOM) report published in 1999.
4.2 Medical Error
The US government Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2000b) was a
sponsor of the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 1999 report titled “To Err is Human:
Building a Safer Health System.” This IOM report led to greater recognition of
27
the need to improve healthcare quality and prioritize patient safety. The report
estimates that approximately $17 billion is spent annually on healthcare costs in-
curred due to preventable medical error, and all medical errors total as much as
$37.6 billion annually (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000b). It
may be as high as 4% of hospital patients that are injured each year, totalling
48,000 to 98,000 unnecessary yearly patient deaths, and placing medical error
related death as the eighth cause of death in the US (Agency for Healthcare Re-
search and Quality, 2000a,b, 2002). In fact, even the minimum of 48,000 medical
error deaths exceeds those due to motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer
(42,297), or AIDS (16,516) (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2002).
Medication errors alone are estimated to kill 7,000 people yearly (Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000b, 2002). Unfortunately, while IT systems
may in fact aid in proper medication disbursement, there is equally a possibility
for a frenzied doctor to choose the neighboring medication from a group of pre-
selected alternatives, or to inadvertently miss a decimal in a dosage. Errors that
would likely be caught on paper disappear and thus become permanent electron-
ically. Medical errors include administering an incorrect medication or dosage,
misreading test results, or improper diagnosis due to vague symptoms (Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000a). Error types include medication, sur-
gical, and diagnostic errors, as well as system failures (Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality, 2000a). System failures are failures in healthcare organi-
zation and delivery (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000a). The
AHRQ writes, “Failures in disseminating pharmaceutical information, in checking
drug doses and patient identities, and in making patient information available are
system errors that accounted for adverse drug events in over half of the hospitals
studied” (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000a). When patient data
is stored in paper journals, there is a greater likelihood that a heavy workload will
result in certain patient journals being absent at the time of appointment (Bemmel
and Musen, 1997, p. 99). Paper journals are problematic because they must be
retrieved from storage for each use, and when one person is accessing the journal,
no one else can do so. If a journal is misplaced or destroyed in a fire, there is
most likely no off-site replica of the missing data. In contrast, computerized jour-
nals are always accessible to anyone with access, and allow for additional features
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which help minimize reliance on human factors like memory, all of which are
more fallible than computerization of data. For example, computerized systems
may include reminder alerts for follow-up tests and alerts to announce critical
lab results. However, such systems may cause healthcare professionals to tire of
and ultimately to ignore messages that are “irrelevant or overly predictable” (Ash
et al., 2004, p. 109).
Standardization of protocols is another important means by which human error
and reliance on human memory may be reduced. For example, another AHRQ-
sponsored study found that use of a computerized system resulted in a four-
fold increase in survival rate among intensive care unit respiratory disease pa-
tients (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000a). Decision support
systems—for example, the use of MYCIN at Stanford University in the 1970s—
are another example of computerization in the medical profession (Bemmel and
Musen, 1997, p. 432). Computerization and systems improvement in medical
practice organization has been shown to improve patient safety, and is of continu-
ing importance. As is reported by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(2000b), “The IOM emphasized that most of the medical errors are systems related
and not attributable to individual negligence or misconduct. The key to reducing
medical errors is to focus on improving the systems of delivering care and not to
blame individuals.” For example, via use of wireless PDAs and bar-coding, one
Veterans Administration hospital reduced medication error rates by 70% (Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000b). It is nonetheless worthwhile to con-
sider the warning of Ash et al. (2004, p. 110) that, “Information systems are on
their own not a sufficient fix for the safety problem. A rush toward implementing
systems might ultimately endanger the quality of care more than help it.”
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Part II
Case Study
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Chapter 5
Hospital Case Study
The cooperating hospital used for the case study research into the problem pre-
sented is the St. Joseph’s Memorial Hospital of St. Joseph’s Community Health
Services, which is headquarted in rural Hillsboro, Wisconsin.
In addition to having a Critical Access Hospital, St. Joseph’s Community Health
Services consists of a nursing home licensed for sixty-five beds with 24-hour
RN coverage and three family practice clinics (with six rotating doctors) located
in Hillsboro, Elroy (Wisconsin), and Wonewoc (Wisconsin) (St. Joseph’s Com-
munity Health Services, 2006). While the approximate population of Hillsboro
in 2004 was only 1300 (US Census Bureau, 2004), and St. Joseph’s is located
within the city limits of Hillsboro, it serves a much larger market area. In fact,
St. Joseph’s Memorial Hospital serves five counties with more than 18,000 resi-
dents (St. Joseph’s Community Health Services, 2006). St. Joseph’s patient mix
represents a demographic in which over 50% rely on Medicare or Medicaid. As
an example, for the 2004 fiscal year for heart failure and shock treatment at St.
Joseph’s, $6,000,000 of costs was attributable to private insurance, while nearly
$9,000,000 was attributable to Medicare and Medicaid (WHA Information Center,
2005).
St. Joseph’s became my case study site as a result of a well-timed administra-
tive decision to restructure their organizational system via a move from paper to
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computerized record keeping. My research is focused on the earliest stages of
this process, namely the period during which the established paper systems are
reviewed and during which an evaluation is done of nursing staff work processes
and needs.
Before proceeding to retell and analyze data collected via observations and inter-
views, it is useful to make the hospital more accessible to the reader by providing
descriptions of both the physical building structure and staff hierarchy, as well as
important to provide an explanation of what data collection methods were used
and why they were appropriate to the particular setting.
5.1 Staff Hierarchy
St. Joseph’s administration is composed of Chief Executive Officer Bill Bruce,
Interim Chief Financial Officer Tom Jones, and Vice-President for Clinical Ser-
vices Toni Tengblad. Additionally, there is a 12 person Board of Directors. The
hospital is staffed in three daily shifts, with separate week and weekend rotation
employees. In addition to the full-time staff, most pool staff hold part-time jobs
in other healthcare facilities.
Involved in the software acquisition process at St. Joseph’s are administrators,
employees whose jobs will be affected by changes to the present organizational
system, and the proprietary software vendors under consideration, most notably
American Data, as well as the Rural Wisconsin Health Cooperative, whose inter-
est it is to see rural hospitals become more inter-connected via technology. Figure
5.1 provides an overview of the various groups that affect the ways in which re-
organization proceeds, as well as whether and to what degree it succeeds. An
important part of the incentive to introduce medical records information systems
in medical facilities is the reduction of error, and the common opinion—supported
by a wealth of research—that such systems do in fact help institutions achieve this
goal. While not an explicit choice, prior to both my and RWHC involvement, St.
Joseph’s administrative decisions regarding implementation steps mirrored those
of Nolan’s Growth Model. This model is based on four phases of growth for an in-
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company Pharmacists CEO and administration
IT/RWHC Hospital Nursing staff
Medical records
personel Secretarial staff Doctors
Figure 5.1: Reorganization Actors
formation system—“1. Initiation, 2. Expansion or contagion, 3. Formalization or
control, and 4. Maturity or integration” (Bemmel and Musen, 1997, pp. 316–317).
5.2 Floorplan
Nurse work station
Interview room
Figure 5.2: Hospital Floorplan
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Chapter 6
Methods: Interviews and
Observations
In addition to the theoretical methodology, it is important to explicitly describe the
practical methods employed during data collection. Sensitivity combined with a
constantly questioning approach to interviews and observation were necessary in
order to draw out more protected and hidden problematic work practices; ideally,
these methods will lead to implementation procedures that may increase social/job
satisfaction and ease the nursing-related problems caused by the transition from
paper to computerized patient records.
Considering the example of more experienced researchers of situated design such
as Suchman and Trigg (1991), I chose to examine specific aspects of the orga-
nization of work in the existing paper-based system, then to make suggestions
for improvement, and in so doing, hope that changes would be made such that
the movement toward computerization was not only better informed, but more
appropriately shaped and directed to ensure a higher level of ultimate success.
Unfortunately, any potential benefit from this work far outlives the time period for
this research, requiring the focus to remain on the present and possibilities. To
examine specific aspects of the organization of work in the existing paper-based
system, interviews and observations were necessary.
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Ghauri and Grønhaug (2002, pp. 49,112) emphasize the importance of a “sam-
pling plan” as particularly relevant when secondary data is not available such that
data must be collected via a survey/questionnaire. Also, it is important to set
up observations of work practices such that “preconceived biases” may be tested
(Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2002, p. 12). It is imperative that a sample group be repre-
sentative of the entire group. In a larger hospital, it would be appropriate to sample
the same number of nurses and nurse-aides, as well as to ensure that different jobs
within each category were equally considered (for example, a head-nurse and a
regular nurse). In contrast, in the interview portion of this study, it made sense to
include the entire group of RNs and their aides, rather than to sample out certain
employees. Sampling is, however, an accurate description of my interviews with
nursing home staff, administration, and external organizations, like the RWHC and
American Data, as well as of my observations within the hospital. In these cases,
the most appropriate individuals were plucked out for discussion and the sample’s
value was based on the individual’s association with the software selection and/or
implementation process and based on needing representation from each category
of knowledge worker associated with the process.
Interviews were conducted with every member of my sample group; in all there
were thirty-one Registered Nurses (RNs) and their support staff which included
Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs), Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs), and hos-
pital clerical staff, as well as senior management, the RWHC and American Data.
A small sample of RNs were then selected for follow-up, observation-based in-
terviews. These observation-based interviews of RNs and their interactions with
support staff and doctors were conducted over several back-to-back shifts. The
interview techniques for each member group within the sample differed accord-
ing to factors such as whether the group held decision-making authority, how the
group perceived me, and whether the group was viewed as holding and perhaps
withholding information important to my research. This last distinction resulted
in some member groups—such as the RNs—being further subdivided; see Chapter
7.2.1.
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6.1 Administration, RWHC, and American Data
My interview methods with hospital administration, the RWHC, and American
Data differed significantly from the those used with hospital staff. With the CEO,
Vice-President of Clinical Affairs, the RWHC and American Data representatives,
I chose to take hand-written notes and had no prepared template. I did have hand-
written, bulleted questions which I laid on the table in plain sight of these individ-
uals. My reason for choosing this approach was that my research focuses on the
challenges met by nursing and nursing-support staff; and therefore, administrative
individuals were of primary use to me for information regarding formal decisions
and their practical foundation, such as financial necessity, and operational con-
cerns. Unlike my privacy promise to RNs, LPNs, and CNAs, the members of St.
Joseph’s administration, my RWHC contact, and the American Data liaison gave
permission to use their names and titles. Further, my relationship to these indi-
viduals differed from RN and support staff in that I could be described as work-
ing for the administration and helping them to cull needed social and operational
information from nursing staff. Despite this interest in the same information, ad-
ministration could ultimately make damaging or terminating decisions about my
project which hospital staff could not; and as such, there existed a lower thresh-
old for casual conversation with the hospital staff. In this way, I experienced the
administration interviews/discussion as more professionally bound, whereas I felt
more like a peer to the nursing staff, due in part to the fact that my interviews with
them were mandated by administration, such that both I and my interviewees had
pre-defined, specific roles.
6.2 RNs, LPNs, and CNAs
Construction of my interview template for RNs, LPNs, and CNAs was governed
by an important aspect of interviewing which is that only questions with variable
answers are relevant and should be included. For example, given that the nursing
and nursing-support staff varies by age and seniority, but are female with the ex-
ception of only two employees, questions about gender related issues within the
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nursing staff are less relevant than questions about hierarchical relationships. It
is wise to tell staff that their responses will be held in confidentiality; it should
be aggregate data which is reported. When analyzing the data collected, it is a
good idea to analyze all users together as one group, as well as to analyze them as
separate groups by title, in order to find out if there are trends specific to title. In
addition to my interviews, my physical presence at the hospital enabled happen-
stance observation and off-the-record, passer-by chatting. The latter, as well as
much to do with my interview technique, falls into the category of ethnographic
methodology and is based on setting oneself into the situation rather than critically
observing from outside.
In order to be explicit about my methods, it is important to explain that the inter-
views were structured insofar as I had my pre-prepared interview template (Fig-
ures A.1 and A.2). However, I did not show the template to interviewees and was
intentionally flexible and allowed some respondents to stray from the template,
skipping sections either because there was more to be yielded from a different
focus, or because the section seemed less relevant for that interviewee than for an-
other. During this more formal data collection, my methods are best described as
open conversation generated from selected questions on the interview template.
I chose to use a laptop to record important verbatim responses, so that I could
capture a certain amount of personal reflection and, as Schultze (2000, p. 11) de-
scribes, “let the people I was studying ‘speak for themselves.’ ” Schultze (2000,
p. 11) explains that she made the choice not to record interviews with those with
whom she would interact more than once; the reason was to create a less “in-
trusive” atmosphere, and to foster “continuity and trust” between herself and the
interviewees. I chose to have a laptop present and to have the option of record-
ing data, and am of the opinion that touch-typing while looking the participant in
the eye helped resolve issues that might otherwise have been present during typed
recording of data. Even so, when the conversations became very personal or the
interviewee began to hesitate, I would demonstrate friendliness and empathy by
placing my hands in my lap, or even shutting the screen. This meant that on par-
ticularly sensitive matters, my only notes were mental, or “headnotes” (Schultze,
2000, p. 11), and these had to be typed up later. In fact, in a couple of cases, my
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“interview” was more of a personal conversation with me acting to reassure the
interviewee of her value to my study. At these times it was beneficial to a support-
ive, open conversation that I officially dismissed the template and the recording of
specific comments, though many of my questions continued to be inspired by my
mental version of the template.
I found one technique particularly useful for drawing RNs, CNAs, and LPNs out
of a rut and for encouraging them to be forthcoming. My technique was to ask
an employee to tell about another, unnamed employee’s experiences, practices,
and even opinions, rather than his/her own. Not unlike a child lured into telling
the truth behind a tall tale, employees were quite ready to say condemning things
about work practices of all but themselves, or even about specific other employee
traits and interpersonal working skills. I found that after some time, certain so-
cial cliques became apparent, as did the common scapegoats and, due to specific
comments and knowing what shifts different employees worked, I was often able
to piece together more of the story from these individual accounts given on be-
half of one another. In other words, allowing employees to construct a protective
shield or safety wall between themselves and their statement proved to be a very
effective method for gathering sensitive information. My technique finds support
in an altered form of this protective shield; work psychology researchers have
shown that in the case of interviews, telephone interviews are likely to be “harsher
than face-to-face ratings” (Arnold, Silvester, Patterson, Robertson, Cooper, and
Burnes, 2005, p. 195). The explanation given—that an absence of visual informa-
tion focuses the interviewee more directly on the interview (Arnold et al. 2005:
195)—clearly does not hold in my technique, but it is my opinion that the same
principle of distancing an interview account from the interviewee is to thank for
the success of my technique in drawing out otherwise protected information. And,
while these ratings may be harsher, they also seem to be more valid (Arnold et al.
2005: 195); according to Schultze (2000, p. 29) and in terms of ethnographic
study, “validity relates to the representativeness of the data and the truthfulness
of an ethnographer’s interpretation.” Validity and reliability may be together re-
ferred to as “authenticity,” which Schultze (2000, p. 29) describes as one of two
minimums of “a convincing ethnographic text;” Schultze describes reliability as
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referring “to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the
same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occa-
sions.” In addition to authenticity, the other minimum is plausibility, which has
to do with the ethnographer’s desk work, or “‘write up’ phase” (Schultze, 2000,
p. 31). Criticality—mentioned earlier in the context of cultural critique—is an-
other important element of ethnographic text (Schultze, 2000, pp. 29–31).
In contrast to my questioning approach during interviews, my observation-based
interviews involved long moments of silence where I was either watching the ad-
ministration and/or recording of care. I was able to see the relationship between
administration of care and the record keeping done for that particular service.
When staff were directly interacting with a patient, I did not interfere by interject-
ing questions. I did find that most staff were aware of my presence and therefore
offered information about what they were doing while they were caring for a pa-
tient. Once out of the patient room, I would observe the recording of data and
then begin asking questions. In fact, because of the inherent nature of hospital
work, I found that I needed to ask questions almost continuously whenever the
staff were not actively aiding a patient or recording data. In this way, I was able to
witness patterns of work, but also to get explanations of routines, and answers to
questions about those things that seemed like discrepancies to me. Some discrep-
ancies did not have satisfying answers and some work patterns were drastically
different depending on which employee I observed.
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Chapter 7
Timeline and Stages
The decision to reorganize the hospital’s record keeping system was made tenta-
tively in 2003 when St. Joseph’s signed an extended contract as a beta-site with
software company American Data; their Electronic Chart System (ECS) has had
success as a nursing home product, but has not yet been introduced and imple-
mented in a hospital. At the time that the contract was signed, no future installa-
tion and “go-live” time estimates were made. In the winter of 2004–2005, St.
Joseph’s administration decided it was time to begin the process of modeling
a hospital-specific IT system. Little forward progress was made in the ensuing
months and it was in the late summer of that same year that administration began
the push for progress. My research at St. Joseph’s began at that time, in Au-
gust of 2005. With a Face-Sheet graphically modeled and a core group of RNs
primed for training sessions, the estimated timeline of events for choices regard-
ing hardware was set for October 2005, and “going-live” was set for January 2006.
Initially hospital administration hoped that my research would span the critical pe-
riod of change from hardware selection through the first months of actual system
use. Early timelines are often skewed. Rather than the initially estimated time-
line with three distinct stages—pre-implementation, implementation, and post-
implementation—my research has been entirely focused on pre-implementation.
Therefore, the timeline here referred to is the timeline of my research, which be-
gan with pre-implementation interviews on what we all believed was the forefront
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2003 2005 2006
Begin modeling hospital IT system
Winter 2005
Management decides
to reorganize hospital’s
record keeping system
2003
RN information sessions with ECS
Spring 2005
Choose hardware (postponed)
October 2005
Start research: interviews
August 2005
Management pushes for progress
Late Summer 2005
Observation-
based
interviews
January 2006
Going-live
(postponed)
January 2006
Figure 7.1: Timeline of Events
of a new system, only to be reformulated several months later into a deeper study
of the flaws and attributes of the existing organizational system. This reexami-
nation by myself, administration, and IT consultants has been fortuitous as it has
actually unraveled the initial process to the point at which not only the timeline
came into question, but the IT product with which to proceed has also been brought
into the spotlight. The following discussion will therefore start with the work done
prior to my arrival and continue from my arrival forward in the chronology that
my research followed. Figure 7.1 shows a timeline of events discussed in this case
study.
7.1 2003-2005: Software Selection
As described in Part I, in response to trends and concerns based on medical error
statistics, hospitals have increasingly begun the move toward computerization and
paperless organizational systems. An entirely paperless environment may or may
not be better and as Walsh (2004, p. 1185) explains, “Having the option to use
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either paper or electronic record output, depending on preference or other clinical
constraints, is important.” Nonetheless, streamlining the products used in the hos-
pital and nursing home has longterm financial value, especially considering that
St. Joseph’s does not currently have any staff whose primary duty is IT mainte-
nance. This means that at present any system acquisition would require mainte-
nance by an outside contractor. Clearly there is value to using the same outside
contractor for both the hospital and nursing home. Already in use for billing was
Dairyland Healthcare Solutions. They offer a comprehensive package for record
keeping and were therefore considered in the quest for a better organizational sys-
tem. Dairyland Healthcare Solutions’ applications may be run separately or be in-
tegrated into a complete system (Dairyland Healthcare Solutions, 2006). Applica-
tion options include financial management, patient management, health informa-
tion management, clinical information management, physician practice, long term
care, and home healthcare (Dairyland Healthcare Solutions, 2006). Also consid-
ered was Epic Systems Corporation which the RWHC and St. Joseph’s administra-
tion consider an industry leader; Epic offers an inpatient clinical system, hospital
and professional billing, managed care administration, ambulatory and handheld
electronic medical record access, scheduling, and registration (Epic Systems Cor-
poration, 2006). Unfortunately, price and the fact that Epic does not currently
sell to small hospitals ruled Epic out of consideration. As already mentioned, in
2003, St. Joseph’s and American Data made an agreement whereby St. Joseph’s
purchased ECS for the nursing home as well as for the hospital. The advantage of
purchasing a package solution was largely financial, with American Data offering
a very reduced price and free training to St. Joseph’s; in turn, American Data re-
ceived a testing platform for the creation of an ECS hospital product. In addition,
St. Joseph’s pays a monthly maintenance fee which covers telephone support and
all uploads and enhancements. Because the relationship between American Data
and St. Joseph’s extends beyond the formal supplier and consumer, St. Joseph’s
has had regular contact with the American Data ECS liaison to St. Josephs, Car-
men Zirbel (Clinical Training/Support Consultant). While American Data’s ECS
is still the active choice, both Dairyland and Epic Systems Corporation are once
again being considered. The following discussion of American Data’s ECS ex-
pounds on the post-contractual relationship between St. Joseph’s and American
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Data, and why ECS is the current, but uncertain longterm choice.
When ECS was introduced into the nursing home, training was done in groups
determined by shift, though all training occurred during the day. The training was
in addition to regular work shifts. When I asked one night shift employee whether
her ability to learn was made more difficult because she would normally be home
sleeping during that time, she responded that she does not require a lot of sleep,
but that others had trouble adjusting.
The hospital’s library computer lab was used as a classroom, with two one-hour
sessions with four-five students in each session. One user described these ses-
sions: “They kind of introduced the program and gave us a kind of overall view
and basic things, and then we were kind of on our own after that. It all depended
on your experience with computers. Once they figured out where our level was,
we could move ahead on our own.” Asked about her feelings, the user explained:
“I thought ‘Oh no! Here we go again.’ I guess I felt overwhelmed again. [...]
But they were really good about not setting deadlines. [...] Their training was
very good. We have a good administration. We always knew who to call and if
we had any problems or anything, we’d just shut the computers down and try to
figure out the problem ourselves.” This narrative reveals many problems, despite
the interviewee’s view that the situation had been a largely positive one. In other
words, her experience was comfortable and safe because she received a helping
hand in achieving what had seemed impossible in the beginning. However, some
of the behaviors glimpsed in this narrative—such as having no deadlines and al-
lowing the computers to be merely shut down in a pinch—apparently resulted in
a prolonged and difficult implementation process, beyond the pre-learning phase.
The real practice came when the users moved out onto the floor and had to use
the knowledge while working. In fact, implementation of ECS in the nursing home
was described by several others—ECS, hospital, and nursing home employees—as
a difficult process. Many said that it went “badly.” ECS’s Carmen Zirbel defended
against similar problems in the hospital with the explanation that there are “differ-
ent issues with an acute care setting,” and that there were management problems
in the nursing home that do not appear to exist in the hospital. Yet one employee
with working knowledge of both the nursing home and hospital told me, “I look
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at our system and I think ‘well how’s that going to apply to the hospital?’ People
aren’t here [in the hospital] for a long time. They’re just here for a short while. In
the nursing home they are there and there and there. You do these things forever.”
Despite whatever problems may have existed during training and implementation,
three years following ECS implementation in the St. Joseph’s nursing home, the
number of citations (i.e., violations of Medicaid participation) had been reduced
from dozens annually to zero. Additionally, as the St. Joseph’s CEO informed
me, internal research shows that post-ECS, less time has been spent on charting.
That citations were reduced to zero on a recent survey and that less time is spent
on charting may not be causally related to the use of ECS. Clearly, if ECS could
be properly shaped to fit the hospital needs, then administration could consider
the decision to form a beta-site agreement with American Data a wise decision.
Unfortunately, reshaping ECS to conform to hospital needs was fraught with un-
foreseen problems.
One of these challenges was the potential for the American Data liaison to be
compromised in her task due to conflicting interests. Zirbel’s previous experi-
ence as a nurse in rural Wisconsin nursing homes and hospitals provides her with
workplace insight and, therefore, an ability to more quickly recognize and under-
stand procedural complaints and software limitations that will lead to employee
workarounds. Given the training consultant’s previous employment as a nurse,
she has her preferred ways of operating, some of which may represent the most
valid choice, others of which may not. She therefore risks being biased against
imposing organizational techniques that upset traditional nursing organizational
systems. As an extension of this bias, she risks being resistant to suggestions
made by administration and other, non-nursing hospital employees. For example,
she may oppose removal of specific nursing standards, such as recording mental
notes on a pocket “cheat sheet” rather than in a computer. In addition to these
potential problems, Zirbel is an American Data employee; and though she recog-
nizes the distinct added variables of an acute care setting, her familiarity is with
the nursing home ECS product. This nursing home familiarity may limit her ob-
jectivity when restructuring the program for hospital use and in particular, when
evaluating the system’s user-friendliness. In contrast, a perspective external to St.
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Joseph’s, prior nursing experience, and American Data may more unequivocally
identify ineffectiveness by using more objectively reliable and valid techniques.
In contrast to Zirbel’s double agent status as an American Data employee and a
liaison helping St. Joseph’s toward their restructuring goal, the RWHC is interested
in the best for rural hospitals and as a separate body can be more objective than
the individual hospitals regarding the move from paper toward paperless. The
RWHC’s focus on rural hospitals—beyond its own survival—is due to the simple
symbiotic relationship between the RWHC and its twenty-nine member hospitals;
given that these twenty-nine rural hospitals wholly own the RWHC, it would no
longer exist if they ceased to exist. This symbiosis is typically quite altered in a
consumer-sales relationship, like that between St. Joseph’s and American Data.
As discussed, conflicting interests are a potential problem in any beta-site agree-
ment. American Data is a separate entity in contrast to the cooperative relationship
between the RWHC and St. Joseph’s; and therefore, while American Data cannot
afford to deplete its customer base and in fact has particular need for St. Joseph’s
as a beta-site, American Data must still act in its own best interests above that
which is best for St. Joseph’s. American Data is interested in a good product.
But in the end, if the product is sound but fails implementation processes at St.
Joseph’s, American Data will have what they needed, even if St. Joseph’s does
not. For these reasons among others, the RWHC has cautioned St. Joseph’s about
getting too deeply involved with one vendor prior to clearly identifying their needs
as well as that which the vendor has to offer. Therefore, St. Joseph’s is continu-
ing the beta-site relationship with American Data, and views the opportunity as
educational, though not necessarily permanent. Currently the beta-site agreement
serves both American Data for obvious reasons and St. Joseph’s as an opportu-
nity to determine what needs exist among staff, interoperability, as well as the
implications of certain regulations (e.g., HIPAA).
Like the RWHC work, mine is supplemental and somewhat external, with my pur-
pose being to focus on the processes involved in bringing new technology into
a previously technology-limited domain. As an outsider, my ability to recognize
and share in RWHC concerns is possibly also more objective than that of either
St. Joseph’s or independent software vendors. Therefore, while I too have a clear
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interest in eventual successful software implementation for St. Joseph’s, I recog-
nize the opportunity to observe and advise in the beta-site implementation process
as a fortuitous one for exposing relationships and conditions that are key to any
software implementation success, and particularly those relevant in healthcare in-
formatics. It is my perception that St. Joseph’s needs may not be met by American
Data despite the fact that American Data has a successful product and well qual-
ified staff. This interpretation will be further explored in Part III. One reason
may be that American Data’s current success is based on a specific core prod-
uct that they may be reluctant to alter subsequent to user testing. In contrast, St.
Joseph’s has been decidedly more flexible about changing their preliminary plan,
as well as more open to suggestion/critique. As a result of this open behavior,
St. Joseph’s improves the likelihood of success in implementation of any system,
whether American Data’s ECS or another.
The two year period that elapsed from the adoption of the nursing home ECS in
2003 to the fall of 2005 and reconsideration of the beta-site agreement illustrates
that the timeline on reorganization is often lengthy and full of setbacks. The first
major step toward adapting ECS to the hospital was made during the spring of 2005
when American Data’s liaison to St. Joseph’s held an in-person ECS-discussion
session with self-selected RNs in the hospital distance-learning equipped library.
As a hospital ECS demo had not been created and the product itself was not ready
to go-live, there were no physical examples or trials available at that time. RN
opinions, reactions to, and suggestions for the described system were collected.
Over the following months, the Director of Nursing and the ECS liaison worked
together to convert a paper Face-Sheet to ECS.
As of early-September 2005, hardware on which to implement ECS was not yet
available in the hospital; it was during mid-September that hospital administration
held a demo and planned to make hardware choices. In fact, hardware choices
were postponed due to concerns about getting locked in to the ECS product, and
thereby limiting the hospital’s information system options. At this time and still
following the initial and optimistic timeline, the ECS nurse admission assessment
form was to be introduced with go-live post-training held or taking place during
the late fall of 2005. As of September 2005, this admission assessment form was
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the only paper-based task that had been integrated in the ECS hospital software.
This uncertainty regarding implementation of ECS bred uncertainty about the best
hardware choice. This, combined with a financial setback, caused the St. Joseph’s
administration to push back the timeline with the intention of picking up the pro-
cess again at the start of the new year. For this reason, after I conducted my
September 2005 interviews with the entire hospital nursing and nursing support
staff, administration, the RWHC, and American Data, my selective follow-up in-
terviews were also pushed back to January 2006.
7.2 September 2005: Interviews
At this point in the timeline, my research plan was still viewed as three-fold with
pre-implementation only the first stage. Given the administration’s goal of iden-
tifying whether real problems matched perceived ones, administration was inter-
ested in the human component and specifically in gathering the opinions, con-
cerns, and goals of nurses who would be affected by the initial implementation of
ECS, or any other reorganization of the current information system. Additionally,
the interviews were viewed as a way of revealing work routines that were ineffec-
tive or error-prone and which would require consideration during re-organization.
Therefore, as explained in Chapter 6, the first important step for me was to inter-
view permanent hospital RNs, LPNs, CNAs, and clerical staff. It was additionally
useful to interview pool RNs and CNAs who have previously experienced the shift
from paper to computer at other healthcare facilities. In total I interviewed thirty-
one St. Joseph’s hospital and/or nursing home staff, as well as met with American
Data’s ECS liaison to St. Joseph’s, Carmen Zirbel (Clinical Training/Support Con-
sultant), Rural Wisconsin Health Cooperative’s Director of Health Information
Technology, Louis Wenzlow, St. Joseph’s Vice-President for Clinical Services,
Toni Tengblad, and St. Joseph’s CEO, Bill Bruce. Please see Figures A.1 and
A.2 for the Pre-Implementation Interview Template that was used only with the
nursing staff.
During the two weeks that I conducted interviews in the hospital wing, I was
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given the use of what would otherwise be a break room. The purpose of having
this room was that it was small and private, and I could shut the door during
interviews. There was a phone in the room so that I could make calls necessary
to my project. The only time period during which the room could not be used
was directly preceding morning rounds, as the nurses needed to use the room for
preparation and the morning updates. The break room is across the hall from
the OB-GYN section of the hospital. Given its proximity and the relative quiet
of the OB-GYN section compared to the rest of the hospital, during the time that
my break room office could not be used, I was able to use the waiting alcove in
the OB-GYN section. This room was relatively private, despite having no door to
signify true privacy to the interviewee. In fact, the OB-GYN room had couches
instead of a table and chairs and, despite the lack of official privacy, offered a
more comfortable space which seemed to relax interviewees. Unlike the break
room, interviewees did not have to enter the room to determine if they were where
they were supposed to be—instead, they could casually approach and could size
me up before we were facing one another across the table. Moreover, the OB-
GYN room allowed me to calmly and quietly observe more interactions among
staff and between staff and patients than I could in the break room. Despite the
unobtrusive approach to my interviews, there were those who were inclined to
withhold information and would clearly have opted out of the interview had they
been given the choice.
Rather than allow for self-selection, administration operated on the assumption
that all would participate. A couple of days preceding the start of my interviews,
a notice was hung in the staff room informing the staff that their cooperation was
requested in the hospital’s participation in a research study on the topic of “Im-
plementing an Electronic Medical Record in Nursing.” The formulation of the
memo as a request for cooperation was an administrative kindness; in fact, I was
to interview all RNs, LPNs, CNAs, and unit secretaries, regardless of whether they
were interested in cooperating or not. This is an important feature of my research
because it meant that I received information from various user-types—those that
might not have signed up voluntarily—and I received very different reactions re-
garding my presence. The memo included the information that I am the daughter
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of a hospital board member, who is also chair of the Mission Committee. Before
my interviews started, my own reaction to staff knowledge of this fact was mixed.
On the one hand, providing the information seemed like a good idea given that,
had it not been provided and staff had become aware of the fact, they might have
assumed me to be an administration spy and therefore been reluctant to share job-
related details. This might be especially true of those that cast themselves or oth-
ers in a negative light. Moreover, that the information was provided allowed me
to directly tackle any misconceptions about my role and allegiances, and thereby
to dispel fear that I would be leaking information, and particularly information
attached to a name, to the Board. However, I was also aware that due to the in-
formation being open, I might face more of a struggle to be taken seriously, and
that as a result, I would have to be more convincing than a true outsider in order
to prove that my opportunity was due not only to having the right contacts, but
also to merit. In fact, my fears regarding the memo were largely assuaged by re-
actions of those who had read it, and more markedly, by the fact that very few had
read it or even knew what I was doing there beyond hearsay from others who had
been interviewed by me. Moreover, while a few employees clearly viewed their
interview as an ordeal and a waste of resources aimed at helping me without offer-
ing anything to the hospital in return, most employees recognized that my project
could have beneficial results for them—their opportunity to really be heard—and
therefore, they saw the project and their participation in it as worthwhile. Some
were even hopeful that I would follow-up with them at a later stage, in order to
again provide an outlet for voicing concerns.
The self-selected RNs from the spring 2005 ECS presentation indicated high mo-
tivation to be involved in the upcoming process, as well as comfort in using a
computer. Those that indicated willingness to computerize their current skills in-
advertently also indicated that they were comfortable and familiar with proper
work routines. The result of staff self-selecting themselves was that the spring
2005 meeting saw a more elite group making suggestions about future changes
and reorganization. It was equally clear that employees who were uncertain of
routines or had weak computer skills were more likely to withdraw from situ-
ations where their lack of knowledge and skills might become embarrassingly
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apparent. There were no such employees at the spring 2005 meeting. However,
when faced with obligatory interviews, these employees could not withdraw and,
interestingly, when I questioned this larger selection of staff, I received several
concrete program suggestions, and understood that too few had been represented
at the spring 2005 ECS meeting. When asked, staff gave a range of reasons for
why they chose not to get involved. The lack of involvement of staff with weaker
computer skills or those who were reluctant to participate, whatever the reason,
exposes certain problems, especially that of encouraging timid users and of un-
covering inefficient work routines. It was particularly apparent that some of the
timid computer users had withdrawn from the spring ECS meeting out of a sense
that they had nothing to contribute or that their feedback would be worthless; had
they even understood at the time that the viewing would not require anything of
them in skill, they might have withdrawn due to this feeling of having nothing to
add. I found that comfort with computerized charting was not only correlated to
age, but to the time elapsed since formal education, and whether St. Joseph’s had
been the interviewee’s only employer.
7.2.1 Categorizing the Human Component
As might have been expected when bringing an outsider into any work place—
and particularly so in one so geographically isolated and in a profession so tuned
to privacy—the majority of employees required several minutes to warm to the
situation. Many hesitated and initially replied with cursory answers. For this rea-
son, after my first day of interviews, I reworked my interview template to include
some general early questions that were unthreatening and calming. Employees
varied a great deal in their willingness to talk to me; some were indifferent, some
eager to share their ideas and pleased to have the audience of someone interested
in the process which was to affect them. And of course, there were also those that
resented my presence and the administration’s expectation that they grant me an
interview. I was happy for the variance, however. As Winthereik, de Bont, and
Berg (2000, p. 55) write, “‘Good’ science [...] challenges pre-set assumptions.
[...] Without resistance, or what Latour calls recalcitrance (Latour 2000; Latour
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forthcoming), the researcher is unable to transform her initial questions, and will
merely reproduce well-known insights.” For this reason, it was particularly im-
portant to me to collect information that showed the spectrum from an individual
employee’s rational, knowledge-work based insights to his or her emotional reac-
tions; this three-fold version of the user consists of the “cognitive, conative, and
affective” (Elsom-Cook, 2001, p. 94). In fact, I learned a great deal from each
category of employee, as their hesitations, body language, and side comments
gave insight into different potential implementation problems, training needs, and
program preferences.
There were four distinct employee types, with a few interviewees falling into more
than one category: lacklustre, timid, confident, and eager. Lacklustre employees
were the smallest group and the only disagreeable one, characterized by a critical
mindset that an outsider should not be permitted to know about work routines,
and especially not about errors or poor routines. Timid users were characterized
by their initial reluctance to share information, not because they had nothing to
share, but because they did not know what to share. Confident employees were
characterized by their straightforward telling of the negative and positive work
routines at St. Joseph’s; this group seemed confident that their jobs were secure
and were ready to help improve St. Joseph’s. Eager employees were a refreshing
group given that they were very engaged in the process and truly eager to help
St. Joseph’s and to help me in the process; however, this group’s willingness to
brainstorm often led to unrealistic wishes which quickly became “needed” rather
than “desirable” features of a new organizational system.
The Lacklustre My presence in the break room in between interviews meant
that, if I were alone in the room and working on my computer (fixing notes from
my previous interview), some were uncomfortable sitting in the room or even
entering to check their mail boxes. Others were unphased and would merely sit
down to take their break—whether to chat a moment with a colleague or to have
lunch. And a few seemed to pop in to say hello to me, to find out if I was learn-
ing anything useful, and to try to offer more information that they’d forgotten
during their interview. In fact, respectively, the behavior upon finding me was
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either timid, confident, or a curious mixture of timid, confident, and eager. It
was only Lacklustre Group employees that unfavorably distinguished themselves,
once again drawing clear lines in the sand. An anecdote from the Lacklustre
Group will explain why this group, disagreeable as they may have been, was im-
portant to consider—from their perspective. One afternoon I had a steady stream
of interviews, but one of the early interviews had to be rescheduled which affected
those who were to come after. While I was waiting for my interviewee to arrive,
two employees entered the break room with their lunch trays, sat down, and began
discussing me and my project—as if I were not there! They were referring to the
project and whether they had yet done their interview with “that girl,” etc. I had
interviewed the one woman already and had deduced that her harsh and resistant
responses had more to do with fear over job loss because she felt inadequate. I
was curious and wondered if I should just ignore them as well. After a bit, the one
I’d not yet met asked me if I intended to sit there throughout their lunch—and bit-
ing at the urge to ask if they intended to sit there through my interview—I smiled
and said that no, I would conduct my afternoon interviews in the OB-GYN room.
At this point I was informed that I needed to respect the environment into which
I had entered, that the room was the “only” room in which they could eat lunch
and that I would have to work around the hospital already in place (there is, by the
way, a very nice cafeteria and dining area in the hospital just a few steps away).
Being pressed to know my place was a good reminder that I truly was an outsider
and was therefore confronted with quite a great challenge in order to gain insight
into work place operations and knowledge.
The Timid My typical first impression of this group was that they were phys-
ically withdrawn and overtly fearful, timid users. In fact, the first part of my
dialogues with this group tended to follow the same pattern for each member in-
terviewed. The initial conversation went as follows:
Me: “Hello.”
Interviewee: 〈nervous nod〉
Me: “Before we get started, let me tell you a little bit about why you
are here and why I would like to talk to...”
52
Interviewee: 〈cutting me off〉 “I don’t know why they have you talk-
ing to me. I don’t know anything about computers, so I can’t help
you.”
What was apparent from this defensive reaction and the discussions that ensued
with this user-type was that some of the quieter, more timid users can provide a
perspective on what is intimidating about a new organizational system, particu-
larly one on a computer. They were also able to make guesses at what might be
comforting, given that the move toward computerized charting is not up for dis-
cussion. Many seemed to react to the fact that the decision to use ECS had already
been made and as a result they had resigned themselves to just get with the pro-
gram, but had a clearly defeated physical look. This group is valuable in helping
to make the system usable to the majority of users rather than merely the confi-
dent and capable ones. Once the initial moments of hesitation were past, unlike
the Lacklustre Group, the Timid Group users were ready to talk about their own
shortcomings. They were very concerned that personal shortcomings would cost
them career success, yet were readier than the Lacklustre Group to make necessary
adjustments and to undergo training to limit the perceived gap between themselves
and higher achieving co-workers. Despite a pervasive lack of personal confidence,
the Timid Group was seemingly unconcerned about job loss and definitely more
inclined toward personal progress than the Lacklustre Group. However, like the
Lacklustre Group and despite feeling secure in their jobs, this group was very con-
cerned about confidentiality; and as a result, they took a long time to warm to the
situation. But unlike the Lacklustre Group, this group did eventually warm to the
situation, though they often maintained that they had nothing valuable to share.
An anecdote about this group shows how it was that this group provided some of
the most important information to my research. Each interview with Timid Group
employees began with the description given earlier of timid users, where the users
entered the room already deep into an apologetic statement that they could not
understand why they had been asked to speak to me, and that they could be of
no use to my research. Yet this was far from true; in fact, it was this group that
had the most members, as well as some members from the Confident and Eager
Groups that could identify (when explicitly asked) with many of the same fears
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and concerns expressed by the Timid Group users. And, it was this group that
was most in touch with exactly what was at the root of various insecurities, both
personal and interpersonal. For example, this group did not merely explain them-
selves as phobic of technology or computer-incompetent, but explained that they
had never become comfortable on a computer due to specific causes, such as an
inability to type, undeveloped spatial skills required of a mouse, and/or a lack of
experiences that provided support for using a computer rather than a pen and pa-
per. They were more aware of the different levels of users than were any of the
other groups, and could also identify with responses that were quite different from
their own. Beyond computer basics, this group recognized potential problems of
using computerized charting, such as patient comfort (particularly among the mid-
dle aged and elderly), privacy concerns (HIPAA compliance), and concerns over
time spent charting versus in active patient care. Most notable about this group
is that it contained no RNs. Perhaps a result of their hierarchically high status
among those interviewed, RNs did not come across as timid, though some came
across as obstructive and uncomfortable with my presence, placing themselves in
the Lacklustre Group. Most RNs fells into the Confident Group, with only a few
in the Eager Group; I attributed this to a greater sense of job security as a result of
being harder to replace, as well as to greater involvement in the decision-making
process due to higher hierarchical value to the institution.
The Confident Though the name is very positive and many of the work-related
traits of this group were indeed positive—a high work ethic, interest in doing a
complete and error-free job, and patient safety and quality as a top priority—this
group was also most likely to identify job related problems with weak and lazy
employees or faulty administrative rules, rather than with ingrained practices, such
as the nurse “cheat sheet” or other handwritten notes. For example, several RNs
informed me that those that had participated in the ECS viewing during the Spring
of 2005 were the more conscientious RNs and that those who had not participated
were uninformed due to a tendency to avoid staff meetings and to generally be
disconnected from their work environment. While some RNs in the Lacklustre
Group did seem both uninformed and lazy, others were among the best informed
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of all user-types regarding who I was and why I was conducting interviews. An
inescapable conclusion is that these individuals had not participated, not due to
lack of information or a disconnection with their work place, but rather due to
disinterest and possible social discomfort with their collegues. The Confident
Group may be further divided into two sub-groups: full-time hospital employees
and pool employees who typically worked more of their time at other facilities.
It was difficult to attain quality information from the full-time Confident Group
because, as with most members of the Lacklustre Group, some members of this
group viewed my relationship to the hospital as purely one-sided, with me gaining
and the hospital merely acquiescing to my research in order to help the daughter
of a board member. In contrast to the full-time members of the Confident Group,
pool employees did not view my involvement negatively. Rather, members of
the pool group tended to be more detached and their confidence tended to spring
from ability and experience rather than hierarchy. Comparing their St. Joseph’s
experience with work in other hospital settings, this sub-group recognized prob-
lems and were aware of the need for change and improvement in operations, and
particularly in paperwork organization. As a result, this faction of the Confident
Group viewed my involvement as important and overdue. Regardless of sub-
group, nearly all members of the Confident Group had a very supportive view of
information systems in medicine, and were so adamant that they could have sup-
ported an ad campaign for any medical-IT company. This support was based—in
general—on experience and personal examples from other hospitals rather than
on pure opinion, which made it quite valuable to me as an outsider to medical
practice. It allowed me to understand in context and via first hand accounts what
I could otherwise only read in other case studies.
The Eager My interactions with this group were distinguished by the similar-
ity to a casual, even friendly conversation about something of intense interest for
the researcher and interviewee alike. This group represented both savvy and hes-
itant users who struggled to distinguish between wants and needs. Some of the
most exceptional ideas came from this group, but they also tended to gain momen-
tum, and simple, good ideas became overdeveloped and too complicated. What
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made many of the ideas exceptional in their original conception was their simplic-
ity. Members of this group were the most enthusiastic about and likely to add to
computer-interface related suggestions for how to ease an eventual transition to a
computer-based system. For example, when asked about a color-coded tab sys-
tem that would replicate the widespread color-coded system used in paper-based
patient journals, the idea that the computerized interface could be familiar rather
than intimidating was a huge factor in their enthusiasm and desire to push fur-
ther with the idea. I encountered a similar response when I asked whether a UPS-
or FedEx-style computerized patient signature tablet could be used to circumvent
such a problem as requiring a patient to sign three copies of the same document.
Whereas the negativity of the Lacklustre and uncertainty of the Timid tended to
limit their creativity, the Eager were very creative, but lacked clear boundaries
about what might be appropriate in any information system. The creativity showed
in discussing changes to the information system was also evident in discussing ed-
ucational options for how to teach new software. The individuals in this group are
easy to like and seem naturally friendly with other staff. They possess a peer-type
leadership quality that makes them a group that could likely help gain support for
new initiatives, as well as a group that is in touch with staff opinions of adminis-
trative initiatives and not afraid to share and discuss potential improvements and
changes to such initiatives.
7.2.2 Human Fears and Quality Concerns
The extent of concern over reorganization and particularly the prospect of elec-
tronic organization was determined by the level of competence the interviewee
felt in their current job. Regardless of employee type, most viewed electronic
charting as a means of disciplining employee behavior (Winthereik et al., 2000,
p. 49); it was only the opinion of whether discipline was needed and/or appropri-
ate that differed from one employee type to another. Those employees that could
give clear descriptions of proper routine tended to prefer a new organizational
system, and particularly one where they felt rule discipline would be a key fea-
ture. Those employees who forgot steps or gave varied explanations of standard
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routines were more concerned that a new organizational system would not only
be difficult to use, but that it would catch them in errors. The most common con-
cern regarding changing organizational policy was of having one’s actions tracked
and stored by the computer. This concern was voiced directly as well as in con-
nection to an apparent concern for the hospital. Both legitimate concerns about
job protection as well as concerns about being caught for improper conduct are
common fears in the introduction of new systems. There was an interesting di-
vide between those workers whose principle concern was clearly St. Joseph’s or
patient welfare and those for whom this raises concern about their job. A good
example is the reaction that occurred when time-stamping was introduced at St.
Joseph’s in early-2005. Time stamping involves employees clocking in and out of
work when they come and go. It was met with two very dissimilar responses: a
view of time-stamping as either unacceptable or legally comforting. One RN drew
an analogy between the “security” of paper time cards and a common preference
for continuing to use paper patient journals. When the electronic stamping system
was introduced, some employees apparently continued to carry around a paper
version of their time card because they were not able to access the internal infor-
mation and were concerned that their hours would be incorrectly recorded. This
demonstrates one form of technophobia, which refers to a fear of using unknown
or modern technologies. In fact, technologies may indeed be initiated as control
mechanisms. The electronic timecard system provides a good example; it not only
ensures accurate reporting to billing, but it acts as an electronic policeman and en-
courages compliance with showing up on time for work. As Akrich (1992, p. 218)
writes, “Some techniques move closer to ‘social control.’ They establish norms
and punish those who transgress them [...] The penalty for breaking the rules—
rules that are both social and technical—is immediate and abrupt [...]” To make
the situation more personally clear, this nurse added, “I’m very visual. If I want a
map to your house, I don’t want to look at ‘MapQuest’ [i.e., MapQuest.com], but
at a paper version.” Unfortunately, paper versions allow changes to be made to
reflect what should have been rather than what actually was, and while staff may
be fearful of this, it is in fact a rather necessary control mechanism, especially in
healthcare where fudging the details can be a life or death issue. As Nordenberg
(2000) writes in the article “Make No Mistake: Medical Errors Can Be Deadly
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Serious” in the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) Consumer Magazine, “Even
the seemingly simple process of giving a patient medicine—the right drug, in the
right dose, to the right patient, at the right time—is, in reality, teeming with op-
portunities for error.” At St. Joseph’s, the greatest concerns came, however, not
from the fear of being tracked or even of serious error, but from a fear of being
expected to accomplish more, and even that ECS might render certain jobs unnec-
essary. Another typical fear was inability to do one’s job due to malfunctioning
or poorly understood technology. Yet, even a fear of losing data fell against a
backdrop of personal concerns. That a backed-up computer copy is more secure
than one copy of a paper journal is not sufficient comfort because the principal
fear is that losses will be traceable; for a majority of those concerned about loss,
the loss is of secondary importance to blame. Even for those for whom blame was
not a focal issue, and who are proponents of the flexibility offered by a paperless
system, there is concern about back-up and tangibility. Many expressed concern
about the ease of viewing records, and whether it would be possible to access a
computer when needed. One RN told me that if she has to walk down the hall to
input information, she won’t be doing that. But she did say, “I’d be more inclined
to put info in right away just because of ease of accessing information. It’d be
like carrying the chart in with you and having the ease of charting and you can’t
[carry all paper charts at all times].” Even if computers are easily accessible, fast
login access is another area of concern. Many were bothered by the number of
login screens necessary for accessing Dairyland Software. As one staff member
told me, “I don’t want it locked up so tight that I have to enter a password and
go through five screens. And now [for bedside charting] you don’t have to just do
that for one patient, but for every single patient.” Lastly, beyond personal fears
of either being caught not doing one’s job or being unable to do one’s job due
to glitchy technology, there were those who expected a negative patient reaction.
The concern was that patients (especially elderly ones) will react negatively to
bedside charting. Interestingly, this concern seemed to be a projection given that
it was most prevalent among the weaker computer users, also those who would
likely react negatively themselves. Many of these users had in fact referred to
my laptop as “that thing” and while they all approved of my using it during their
interviews, they were clearly uncomfortable with its mere presence. This is a
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particularly clear example of the technophobia present in many of St. Joseph’s
employees (particularly in the Lacklustre and Timid Groups).
7.3 January 2006: Follow-Up Interviews
My January 2006 hospital research is best described as selective extensions of the
interviews I conducted in September 2005. In addition, I conducted follow-up
interviews with each of the CEO, the Vice-President for Clinical Services, and the
RWHC’s Director of Health Information Technology, plus observed St. Joseph’s
monthly HIPAA meeting.
Rather than merely re-interview a selective group of RNs, it made sense to al-
low them to use props to show me in detail what some of them had struggled to
convey during our previous interviews. This in practice meant that much of the
two-three hours spent interviewing a given RN involved pauses and observation
while she worked directly with patients. However, while walking between patient
rooms or in the quieter hours, the time allowed for the RNs to give me examples
in the form of paperwork or even showing me where papers are stored, placed
when filled out, etc. As I am not acquainted with or educated in nursing or hos-
pital routine, this hands-on visual observation proved a great supplement to my
understanding of what was explained to me in the condensed September 2005 in-
terviews. Because I had interviewed the entire group in September, I was aware of
and ready to ask about the many different perspectives and explanations for vari-
ous work routines. In addition to getting many of my questions answered, these
follow-up interviews allowed a broader spectrum of staff to clearly and explicitly
describe their work routines. For those RNs and support staff whose command of
language is weaker than their command over the demands of their job, this blend
of interviewing and observation provided them an opportunity to better express
themselves via use of such props and hands-on examples. Structuring this round
of interviews in this way clarified the September 2005 interviews. I was thus able
to determine what was actually done rather than what I was lead to believe was
done. In other words, this eliminated some of the self-protective and secretive
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elements that had held certain information at bay in my interviews with all the
employee types, though particularly with the Lacklustre. For example, I was cu-
rious to see whether dictation machines were actually used and whether the RNs
recorded their meetings with one another. My suspicion was that recordings were
at most rarely used for either dictation or meetings; this was one of the discrep-
ancies that the seemingly more reliable interviewees had not asserted, but that the
Lacklustre had. Indeed, recordings were not used once nor was the equipment
ready for transport to where meetings occur. The Lacklustre seemed to have spun
a tall tale to comply with what sounded like better practice.
The Director of Nursing believed it was best for me to be on-site in the hours lead-
ing up to and following shift changes, and that I ought to be assigned to shadow
a specific RN during each visit. The reason for assigning me to the hours leading
up to and following shift changes is that these are the times when staff record
the majority of the patient information from their shift, as well as when they are
reporting to the next shift. Also, by including two hours of a normal shift, plus
the end and start of shifts, I was able to get a more complete understanding of
what happens at various times throughout any given shift. Rather than three daily
shifts like what had existed in September 2005, in January 2006 the hospital was
operating with only two daily shifts and the Head Unit Coordinator departing at
3 PM rather than 6 PM as previously. In order to accommodate being present at
the start and end of shifts, I arrived at 5 AM each of three days, departed in the
mid-morning, returned again at 4 PM, and departed again around 9 PM. In this
way, I was able to observe the “morning meeting” where the night RN and her
support staff would brief the incoming two RNs, then again in the evening when
the two departing RNs would brief the incoming night shift. Also, I was able to
see how information was passed along in the hospital—when the morning RN shift
would take over, I watched the morning nurse report, then watched as one of the
day shift RNs reported to the doctors for “Grand Rounds” what she had learned
from the night shift. Grand Rounds is the doctor’s daily update meeting and is
held each morning at 8 AM. I took notes during both the nurses’ and doctors’
meetings. Comparison of these notes provides a good indication of the reliabil-
ity of the purely verbal communications that supplement the more official paper
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communications.
7.3.1 Work Routines
Prior to describing specific incidents and work sequences, it is useful to provide
basic information concerning the nurse work station and the work done in this
room. The nurse work station is the locus of paperwork flow and where commu-
nication between the hospital wing and other departments occurs. There is only
one employee whose job is to stay in this room. That is the Head Unit Coordinator
(HUC), or hospital secretary. She is positioned in front of the phone and the only
personal computer in the room. Not once during my time in the hospital did I
ever see her or anyone else use the computer except for a non-job-related Internet
search. It is apparently sometimes used by the night staff for playing music, and
occasionally by the HUC for memos, but its primary function is as an Internet ter-
minal. There are an additional three chairs with desk space in the room. At most
times there were employees occupying at least two of these spots, whether filling
in forms or having an impromptu meeting with one another. The morning and
evening shift change meetings which will henceforth be called “nurse report(s)”
were held in this room. Because nurse reports occur when the HUC is off-duty,
the nurses have to be present to answer incoming calls. Additionally, there may
be people coming through the ER doors during hospital clinic hours, as well as
patients needing assistance. When there is no other staff present to come find
a nurse in such a situation, it is necessary for them to hold the nurse reports in
this public space. Of course, this also means that they must be very cautious in
what they say and how loudly they speak. Within the work station is the sepa-
rate “Dictation Room” which is only rarely used for medical records transcription
and mostly functions as a coat and handbag room for on-duty staff. The room
has a door into the work station and from within the room the telephone, radio,
and patients can be heard. Yet, the room itself offers a barrier of protection for
more private conversation. It therefore seems that this room could be even more
multifunctional, additionally serving as a nurse meeting room. For now, the nurse
report at shift change remains in the open area of the nurse work station. Figure
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7.2 shows a diagram of the nurse work station and Figure 7.3 shows a picture of
the nurse work station.
Nurse Cheat Sheet During the nurse report at shift change, the incoming RN
refers to and copies numbers out of the “Nurse Notes” section of the patient jour-
nal. In addition, nursing staff keep a nurse report sheet, which most nursing staff
refer to as the “nurse cheat sheet” (Figure A.8) and which is updated through-
out one’s shift and which should correspond to all other cheat sheets. In order to
correspond with one another, someone has to periodically update the main cheat
sheet which is kept at the desk by the HUC in the nurses’ work station. Figure 7.4
illustrates the work routines associated with ideal use of this artifact.
As the blanks indicate, these sheets function as a shift-long, temporary record of
each patient’s necessary records such as intake, output, and vitals. In the “Other
Comments” section, some nursing staff also took notes regarding non-medical is-
sues such as patient emotions, family visitations, etc. Though the cheat sheets
should correspond to each other, they are in fact highly personalized. For ex-
ample, during nurse report, two people might record information for one patient
using different note taking styles to record different aspects of the same infor-
mation. During one nurse report, the LPN present primarily wrote information
pertaining to the emotional problems of a particular patient, and pressed the con-
versation to discuss this patient’s need for more family visitation, etc. In contrast,
the RN focused explicitly on physical data, though it was clear from the discus-
sion that both assumed a relationship between the emotional and physical. When
asked why the information recorded on the cheat sheets was so different, the RN
explained that each person filters the information through a lens of importance
based on job role. Nurse report also offers a time for handwriting and shorthand
to be deciphered before shift change. During nurse report, those routines requiring
records and necessary for all patients are discussed on a patient-by-patient basis.
These routines include preparing a Face-Sheet and an “Admission Assessment”
upon arrival, administration of medications, recording intake (food, liquid) and
output (feces, urine, vomit), and keeping a charge sheet.
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Patient Journal Rack
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Figure 7.2: Nurse Work Station Floorplan
Figure 7.3: Nurse Work Station Picture
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Figure 7.4: Nurse Cheat Sheet
Face-Sheet and Admission Assessment The admissions process involves many
standard procedures and paperwork. A description of the admissions process fol-
lows and is illustrated in Figure 7.5; note that administrative paperwork like the
Face-Sheet or Patient Registration Questionnaire may be completed prior to com-
pletion of the admission assessment form and as such, the top and bottom halves
of the task chain may change places. The nursing work assosicated with admis-
sion is made up of the nursing assessment, followed by a 24-hour patient care
flow sheet, and completion of a care plan. At this point, the patient is officially
admitted and provided with an identification bracelet. All ER patients must be
seen by a doctor. The physician work associated with admission includes making
admission orders that will be copied to the Medication Admininstration Record
(MAR) and taking the patient history and giving a physical. At admission, the
Face-Sheet must also be completed. During the front desk business hours of 8 AM
to 6 PM, the front desk prints the Face-Sheet for the nurses. The Face-Sheet is a
general registration sheet which may be printed from Dairyland if the patient has
previously been a patient at St. Joseph’s. However, Face-Sheets include financial
information and may only be printed by staff working at the hospital’s front desk.
If a patient comes in outside of the front desk hours, the nurse handling patient
admission gives the patient the Patient Registration Questionnaire (Figures A.5
and A.6) which allows the nurse to generate a modified form of the Face-Sheet.
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Additionally, a temporary patient number is given until the following morning
when the front desk staff return and are able to print a complete Face-Sheet and
assign a permanent patient number. A patient’s number never gets re-used, even
after the patient dies. The numbers are 5-digits; the first number ever given was
00001. Social security numbers are not used because this causes a problem when
a person is dead or comatose and there is no identification on the body.
Though the admissions assessment (Figures A.3 and A.4) contains most of the
same information as the Face-Sheet, it is a medical rather than administrative
form. In the ER, the admissions assessment is filled out by an RN and then left
outside the patient’s room for review by the doctor.
While preparation of both the Face-Sheet/Patient Registration Questionnaire and
nurse admission assessment involves redundant work given that they contain much
of the same information, they serve different purposes and are stored in separate
systems. Though the Face-Sheet information is stored in Dairyland, the actual
print-outs of both the Face-Sheet and admission assessment are stored as paper
files. Face-Sheets are stored at the front desk for monitoring whereas admission
sheets are filed into the patient journal for every visit to the ER. In addition to the
Face-Sheet and admission assessment, most of the general information such as
patient name, address, age, gender, evaluating RN and physician is copied a third
time into the “Emergency Room Register” (Figure A.7).
Medication Administration Record (MAR) After a patient is admitted and be-
gins treatment, one of the most important records for that patient becomes his/her
record of medication which is stored in the MAR book. The MAR book (Figure
A.9) is at all times kept together with the medication cart. In addition to the MAR
for a given patient, each patient has a drawer on the cart and notes from one shift
to another, as well as extra medication in a syringe, etc. may be left in the pa-
tient’s drawer. It is up to the next shift whether they use what is already opened
and available in the drawer.
At night, orders often occur more quickly because doctors in the ER tell RNs about
orders rather than informing them via the HUC. There were quite a few complaints
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about the time taken during the day between when a doctor makes any order (med-
ical, changing of intake and output readings, change in observations, etc.) and
when the order is discovered and processed by the HUC. Figure 7.6 illustrates the
medication ordering process for orders written by the doctor. In the event that a
doctor is not present or is occupied, an RN can take both telephone and verbal
orders. The order must, however, be co-signed by the doctor prior to changing
patient care. It is important to note that if a medication order changes verbally,
the RN may make the update in the MAR, but the original doctor’s order within
the patient journal may remain unchanged. Carbon copies of the doctor’s order
from within the patient journal is removed by an RN or the HUC and transferred
to a box on the patient journal cart. The box functions as a mailbox to update the
pharmacy about new orders. In practice, the pharmacy discovers if they do not
have an updated order when, for example, an RN calls in the morning for a drug
from an order submitted the night before, but the pharmacy has not yet received
that order.
Charges Medications, syringes, and bandages all represent items that require
documentation for reimbursement, whether that reimbursement comes from Med-
icaid, Medicare, patient insurance, or private funds. As charges are accrued for
a given patient, stickers are affixed to the charge sheet (Figure A.10) for that pa-
tient. Of course, if the medication cart is wheeled to a given room and a charge is
accrued, the RN may affix the sticker to her apron or the cart so that she remem-
bers the charge until she is able to transfer the sticker to the appropriate patient’s
charge sheet. Charge sheets are filled out in the evening for all patients, and are
due by midnight. Unfortunately when the stickers are stuck onto gowns of those
administering care, the RN may forget to transfer the sticker if she is very busy or
is called into another room before she returns to the nurse work station to update
the patient’s charge sheet. In the meantime, the sticker may lose its ability to stick
and with time fall off the gown. I found stickers in the staff bathroom and on the
floor of the nurse work station. Figure 7.7 illustrates the work routines associated
with a properly handled charge.
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Patient Journals In addition to the individual MARs, each patient has their own
current patient journal. Any previous hospital visits are kept in a storage journal
and stored in the basement of the main St. Joseph’s facility which the nursing
home and hospital share. For patients currently in the hospital, both journals will
be kept in the nurse work station on the patient journal rack during the duration
of the patient’s hospital stay. Following the stay, the current journal contents will
be added to the older journal and that will be returned to basement storage. The
patient journal rack is wheeled and is quite a bit taller than the average nurse;
binders lay with their spines facing outwards. This way patient and doctor name
and room number are clearly visible on all journals. Additionally, bright orange
“Allergic To:” and “Do not Resucitate” stickers may be affixed to the spine. In
addition to these stickers intended for quick notification, charge stickers may be
affixed inside the journal as a reminder of specific procedures for which costs
must be reimbursed by either the patient, their insurance, or one of Medicare or
Medicaid. Journals that are being frequently referenced and those which need to
be passed on to a doctor or nurse for review, signatures, and care updates, or to
the HUC for typing, are put in a pile on the corner of the work station desk. When
present, tabs are pulled out of the book to indicate what type of treatment the
journal is awaiting. When a journal is intended for more than one employee, the
idea is that whoever gets to it first, returns it to the pile after doing whatever they
needed to do. Found next to the current journal is a patient’s previous journal,
in which all previous visits are logged. The present journal makes no reference
to previous hospital visits, even in cases where two visits are related. One RN
explained that because of the “advantage of such a small hospital”, medical staff
will often remember a patient and know to reference the old journal. Of course,
bedside manner may be enhanced by familiarity and, if a doctor’s memory allows
her to provide her patients with better bedside manner, that is a definite plus. And
of course, if this were not important to patients, people would have no qualms
going to a different doctor each time they needed a check-up or something was
wrong with them. But, doctor memory is not always sufficient and clear and
therefore precise records go a long way toward assuring safe care and reducing
errors caused by faulty memory. Figure 7.8 illustrates how and by whom the
patient journal is used.
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Addressograph Plate Stamper Journal forms as well as the MARs must be
labeled with basic patient information in order that there be no record confu-
sion. Given that information flow is not computerized, the nurse work station is
equipped with an Addressograph Plate Stamper machine which imprints patient
name, address, and social security number onto a plastic card which may then be
pressed into any records for that patient. For example, the plastic card is used to
make imprints on wrist bands and hand-written forms that are permanently filed in
the patient journal. Using the plastic imprint cards from the Addressograph Plate
Stamper requires a three-step process (see illustration in Figure 7.9).
Telemetry Machine In addition to recording tools used by the HUC, RNs, and
RN support staff, there are tools whose only purpose is to alert staff to a changed or
serious situation, and which may create distractions in an already busy room. For
example, a screen displays data from five patient telemetry machines. This screen
beeps to indicate that one of the displayed patient’s data is not what it should be;
during my time there, the machine was beeping most of the time, but the majority
of the beeps could be ignored because they were due to a condition that the RN
was aware of with a specific patient. Such exceptions are apparently common and
mean that the machine is frequently beeping when all the problems are accounted
for. See Figure 7.10 for an illustration of the work associated with use of the
telemetry machine.
Scanning Radio Adding to the ringing telephone, beeping telemetry display,
and employee chatter is the scanning radio. This radio is constantly turned on
and though I was distracted by it, it did not seem to bother most of the employees
nor did they seem to be listening to the radio. I asked what good it did when no
one was listening. Apparently a specific tone identifies when an alert originates
in Vernon county where St. Joseph’s is located. While not actively thinking about
the radio, employees explained that they were aware of the radio and ready to
act if the tone was heard. If this alert is heard, nurses know to listen and get a
“heads up” that a patient is coming into the ER. This means that the room can
be prepared for the type of alert and even, in the case where enough detail is
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given that a patient name can be determined, a Face-Sheet may be prepared for
the patient, and someone can call down to journal storage in the event that the
patient has previously been treated at St. Joseph’s. The EKG machine does not
work without a patient number and this allows the proper patient number to be
input and stored with the data rather than the emergency input number 111 where
the data must later be copied over to the proper patient number. In other words, if
aware of an incoming ER patient and prepared with basic patient information, not
only is it possible to collect information relevant to patient safety (for example,
allergies), but later work is reduced. Therefore, these type of preparatory activities
help reduce ER stress when the ambulance actually arrives as well as after the fact.
Figure 7.11 illustrates the work that occurs between when the radio tone indicates
an incoming ER patient and the patient’s actual arrival.
Hospital Communication Book In addition to all of these obtrusive devices
and the regularly used tools such as the MAR book, patient journals, charge sheets,
Addressograph Plate Stamper, etc., the nurse work station desk is home to a
chaotic collection of Post-its and scattered papers with phone lists, manuals, and
information folders such as the “Hospital Communication Book” which all em-
ployees are supposed to read daily; Figure 7.12 illustrates use of this book. This
book contains hospital calendars, important printed emails and messages, as well
as potluck invitations, and entry information for a “Fundraiser Cookbook.” It is
the official place where “Please Read” notices are posted, and taped inside the
back cover of the book is a Post-it that reads “This book will be emptied each
month into the ‘Master’ book on the counter by the sink. Please initial when
you have completed reading an item. Thanks!” At the time I flipped through the
book, content in the book ranged from 2004 to the present. With the information
overload in the nurse work station, it was unsurprising that I never once saw any
employee open the Hospital Communication Book. I discovered it buried under a
pile of other papers in the corner with the computer.
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Part III
Analysis and Conclusions
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Chapter 8
Redundancy and Error
Employees with little or no technical and/or computer skills voiced concern that
a new IS would create errors or unexplained data loss. The introduction of IT in
healthcare does raise legitimate concern for errors due to the disruption of the tra-
ditional communication flows. Throughout a shift, nursing staff may discover that
they are missing information or they themselves may have information needed by
other staff. And, “. . . when time is spent trying to find missing information instead
of talking to patients, the ability to provide quality care is further impeded” (Elder
and Hickner, 2005, p. 618). Efficiently communicating this information requires
staff coordination and discretion regarding the use of redundancy. Redundancy
may or may not be productive, and whether the value surpasses the effort may be
difficult or even impossible to determine. By this argument and for the purpose
of this analysis, redundancies may be broadly categorized into a spectrum from
productive to unproductive (sometimes even counterproductive) where the middle
represents a gray-zone. The productive value of a redundancy may be determined
by examining whether the associated inefficiencies outweigh the associated re-
sults. Determining the productive value of a redundancy may be approached by
asking the following questions: how do the inefficiencies and results balance out,
or what price in terms of time and resources is paid for which results? For whom
is the redundancy useful and in what context? Even when these questions are ex-
amined and carefully argued, some of these cases will remain unclear and hence
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fall into the gray-zone. An overview of the criteria and some examples of un-
productive, productive, and gray-zone redundancies appear in Table 8.1. Because
of my focus on paper routines in both my early interviews and later observation-
based interviews, and the enormity of a study focusing on both oral and written
communication, an explicit, detailed discussion of oral redundancies is outside
the scope of this project. However, given that oral redundancy plays a constant
role in communication exchange and the production lattice within the hospital,
certain aspects of oral communication and redundancy are considered necessary
in the analysis of other redundancies and, as such, oral communication is briefly
outlined with consideration for the best placement for certain verbal redundancies
along the spectrum of redundancy.
Information may be communicated orally or in writing, and some information is
communicated in both forms. For example, a narrative style “nurse notes” entry in
the patient journal may mirror the oral narrative given at nurse report. When infor-
mation is communicated in both forms, a redundancy occurs in the work routines
of the person conveying the information and also possibly in the work routines
of the person receiving the information. Oral, narrative information exchange
may influence the interpretation of the information differently than would written
exchange. Coiera and Tombs (1998, p. 675) refer to disruptive, synchronous ver-
sus asynchronous communication. In synchronous communication, two people
are engaged in face-to-face or telephone conversation and this type of commu-
nication is often characterized as disruptive and contributing to inefficiency. In
Type Criteria Examples
Productive redundancy
moderately inefficient ordering medication
decreases error potential RN & doctor reports
reinforces quality
Gray-zone
moderately inefficient note-based charting
moderate error potential synchronous reports
unreliable result
Unproductive redundancy
inefficient admission paperwork
increases error potential copying med. orders
undermines quality duplicating cheat sheets
Table 8.1: Redundancy Spectrum
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asynchronous communication, both parties do not need to simultaneously par-
take in the exchange of information. It is possible for them to exchange infor-
mation via various messaging systems—email, voicemail, letters. In medicine,
events occur which require immediate response, and the initiating party seems
to need recognition from the recipient that the message has been received. This
need for acknowledgement may lead to appropriate interruptions—synchronous
communication—but will also and likely more often lead to situations where asyn-
chronous communication would suffice. St. Joseph’s employees have email and
voicemail, but neither is used reliably. Some employees are more conscientious
than others, but most reported not finding the time to check and not needing to
check due to verbal exchanges. In addition to preferences for synchronous com-
munication, email goes unused due to individual computer insecurities and a lack
of available computers. Relying so heavily on verbal exchange raises not only the
risk that something may be forgotten, but that something may be misunderstood
without any context for double checking. In such a small town it is a likely sce-
nario that two patients with the same last name and similar first names might be
being treated simultaneously at the hospital; if information is passed verbally and
not in written format, there is no opportunity to visually check that information
passed verbally from one employee to another does not end up confused with the
other patient.
Interruption might lead to distraction and hence errors such as confusing patient
names. Clearly the disruptiveness inherent in medical work creates opportunities
for error and ought therefore to be avoided when possible. Consider the difference
between a system where someone interrupts you to deliver information versus a
system where there is no forced disruption and you rather check a given loca-
tion (sometimes repeatedly) for a needed piece of information. Recall Grudin’s
(1988) calendar example. Requiring employees to keep their appointment books
up to date at all times was an administrative convenience, but a time consuming,
added task for employees. The idea was not flawed, but the implementation of
it was. Technological enthusiasm and the belief that technology will solve exist-
ing problems can mean that technology is self-promoting. Imposing technology
on work routines sometimes is given precedence over understanding and respect
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for employee and medical needs (Coiera and Tombs, 1998, p. 673). In contrast,
technologies that are implemented in such a way that they increase user conve-
nience are more likely to be welcomed. As one confident pool RN explained, in
her other job the surgery schedule is computerized which makes her job easier;
rather than being assigned work times based on publishing her entire schedule,
the surgery schedule was published and the employees worked around that. From
a coordination perspective this is also a more logical and efficient approach. This
RN explained, “We choose times. It’s more efficient than running that piece of
paper to all the departments.” Time constraints mean that effective coordination,
such as that described by this RN, cannot only minimize work efforts associated
with redundant activities and unnecessary interruptions, but will likely also lead
to a reduction in error.
Whether information is passed along in verbal or written/computerized form (or
both), communication and coordination errors represent an opportunity for serious
error. In fact, communication errors account for twice as many deaths as errors
due to the lack of medical competence or skill (Walsh, 2004, p. 1185). Some
argue that redundant behaviors help catch communication errors and as such are
essential to quality care. Of course, others argue that redundancy creates oppor-
tunity for communication error and misunderstanding. In fact, the most balanced
argument claims that while many forms of redundancy are harmful, there are cer-
tain types of redundancy that are beneficial due to functioning as a double-check
system (Cabitza et al., 2005, p. 160). In these cases, redundancy may involve du-
plicate efforts by multiple employees who cooperatively reinforce one another’s
work. At St. Joseph’s, the handling of a medication order is a prime example (re-
fer to Figure 7.6). That this paper-based work flow is redundant does not mean
that it is inherently flawed nor is it necessarily an improvement if an electronic
system removes this redundancy. In fact, in this case, safety is increased because
each of the doctor and RN must review and sign the order and finally, before the
order is filled, the pharmacist does the same. The price paid is that one piece
of information is reviewed by three workers, but the result bought for the price
is ensuring safety by reducing medication errors. While this current redundancy
does tend to reduce medication errors, it also could be simplified without losing
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the benefit of the double-check on something so important.
In contrast to the seemingly valuable, productive (though overly-complicated) re-
dundancy present in the medication ordering process, the redundancies involved
in patient admission paperwork create opportunity for error and are therefore un-
productive. For example, given that the non-medical information contained on
the Face-Sheet and admission assessment are standardized blanks for birthdate,
address, etc., it is unnecessarily complicated to require nurses (during the hours
in which the front desk is closed) to record this information twice. Addition-
ally, if the Face-Sheet is prepared by the front desk and the admission assessment
is prepared by an RN, the patient must also fill-out the same information twice.
If the Face-Sheet were transferable, it would reduce the time spent by both the
patient and the RN on the admission assessment and make the focus a medical
rather than administrative one. Recall that this particular problem is present in
the paper-based system and would not have been solved when St. Joseph’s moved
to a computerized patient record system had the financial IT system remained the
same. This inefficiency is one that the nurses griped about and which signaled an
early warning not to use non-compatible IT systems within the same facility.
It is not only inefficient that patient registration information must be copied twice,
but it presents opportunity for error without introducing extra opportunities to
catch an error. This is because demographic and individual information collected
from the patient is not information that a nurse can be expected to correct or to
recognize as inconsistent from one form to another. A mentally competent pa-
tient will be more likely to know their address, age, and other personal informa-
tion than will the receiving nurse. It can be expected that the patient will fill out
his/her information correctly whereas on duplication, the nurse may not catch a
transcription error. A missed or altered name on a drug allergy or a pre-existing
medical condition might mean that the patient gets improper or dangerous care. A
simple name transcription error could mean that Jon Smith receives Joe Smith’s
medication. Clearly the duplication of Face-Sheet information onto the admission
assessment is an example of unproductive redundancy where the redundancy is
both inefficient and increases the potential for error. In addition to the extra work
of duplicating patient name and other general data from the Face-Sheet onto the
80
admission assessment, the ER Register is a third location where this information
must be copied and therefore another opportunity to make a transcription error.
After recognizing unnecessarily redundant routines such as the duplication of pa-
tient information onto the Face-Sheet, admission assessment, and ER Register, it
is important to consider removing the unproductive redundancy from the stan-
dard work routine. Of course, removing an unproductive redundancy may create
an unexpected ripple effect whereby other routines are inadvertently and possibly
negatively altered. And when altering tasks, it is particularly important to “find the
optimal interaction level between standard and health care worker” (Timmermans
and Berg, 2003, p. 81). During my interviews at St. Joseph’s, it was most dif-
ficult to address impractical and unproductive work practices which had become
part of the comfortable routine, and which were therefore protected, defended,
and idealized. Inefficient practices which could be blamed on “the system” or
on administrative requirements surfaced more quickly than did those created by
staff shortcomings, laziness, or “workarounds” (Berg, 1999, p. 385). RNs grip-
ing over the Face-Sheet and admission assessment forms is a good example. In
contrast, RNs, LPNs, and CNAs were alike in their inclination to withhold or dis-
guise information related to personal shortcomings or work routines. There was
a clear desire to protect inefficiencies which had become routine; because of the
“empowerment” derived from being solely (individually or as a group) capable of
delivering certain work, it is common for workers to protect work practices and
to thereby hinder information system research which is focused on work practice
and organizational change (Suchman, 1995, p. 56). St. Joseph’s employees’ most
frequently mentioned inefficient work practices were indeed those which resulted
from administratively imposed organizational standards; these imposed standards
often involve inefficient and unproductive redundant work practices such as mul-
tiple copies of paper charts and re-writing similar details in different locations.
Admission paperwork is an example of administratively imposed, unproductively
redundant work. In contrast, the medication order process is an example of admin-
istratively imposed, productively redundant work which has the important utility
of reducing error. Recall that this is due to the fact that in these cases the re-
dundancies function as multiple check-points at which an error may be caught by
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any member of the cooperative medical team. Inefficiency does not necessarily
translate to increased risk for error and the value of productive redundancy may
outweigh the negative impact of inefficient work.
While productive redundancy may improve communication in a paper-based set-
ting by requiring check-points, there is still the possibility that duplicating data
may result in inconsistencies (Cabitza et al., 2005, p. 164). For example, in the
medication order process, the check-points review data from the same source. As
a result, there is no risk of inconsistent duplication in the actual ordering process.
However, when an RN copies ordered information to the MAR, to a cheat sheet
or other form, the risk of inconsistent duplication is present and is an example of
unproductive redundancy. Here the price is repetitive work and the result is an in-
creased potential for error. To ensure consistent duplication from the medication
order to other forms, it would make sense if after completion of the three-step ap-
proval process for the order, the approved data could be electronically transferred
to the other forms. An implied solution is therefore to maintain productive redun-
dancy, but in a computer-based system that would ensure consistent duplication.
It is important to maintain the productive redundancy in a situation like this rather
than to design the computerized system to skip the check-points and merely du-
plicate needed information. If the check-points are removed and the computer is
responsible for administering duplicate information wherever appropriate in the
patient journal, the oxymoron is that then—while the redundancy still serves a
purpose of making the patient journal easier to read with less reliance on cross-
referencing—the redundancy no longer serves the original purpose of improving
communication by requiring several check-points. One problem is solved, but a
previously nonexistent issue arises as a problem. As the purpose of this project
was not to map the current paper-based system to a computerized system, but
rather to evaluate the current system for inefficiencies and error potential, the re-
sult of computerizing redundancies does not require further discussion here. What
does require further discussion is whether those redundancies identified as produc-
tive (or “back end”) are serving the intended purpose and are free from unwanted
duplication inconsistencies. Given that St. Joseph’s nursing staff prefer verbal ex-
change, a redundant processing of the verbal information would certainly serve a
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purpose. As Cabitza et al. (2005, p. 160) write, “As a general rule, redundancy
serves to make actors involved in a communicative process sure of what has been
communicated.”
Memory-based, shift-end charting was one opportunity for error that I would have
expected nursing staff to protect because it reflects shortcomings related to their
ability to do the job they are expected to do. And in fact, during my interviews I
was given the impression that shift-end charting was not ideal and only occurred
sometimes. The explanation given involved placing the blame on administrative
requirements that lead to overly time-consuming, redundant activities. During my
observations it was obvious that most, not some, charting occurred at shift-end.
However, it was also clear that this was not due to laziness and was due to that
the staff was truly busy. In response to my question about concern that things
might get missed in the paper charting as a result of focusing on memory and
verbal explanations, I received the following answer: “It works pretty good, but
there are sometimes that it doesn’t. When it gets extremely busy. . . When there
are too many admissions, there are things that get missed.” This RN was neither
lazy nor careless and yet she held a very nonchalant view of the importance of a
small detail being missed in the paper records. On the other hand, the redundancy
involved in note-based, shift-end charting allows she who is charting to review
and more effectively phrase observations and relevant comments. This may help
ensure understanding and therefore be a productive redundancy. Of course, in
the case of numbers being ferried from a note to a final destination, the chance
of a duplication error is greater when the information has to travel farther. If a
duplication error occurs, the redundancy of copying from a note to the chart is
clearly unproductive. The price of note-based, shift-end charting is moderate and
the chances of gain or error due to shift-end charting is also moderate, with neither
being more likely than the other. Therefore, note-based, shift-end charting falls in
the gray-zone on the spectrum of redundancy and the utility of pocket notes or the
cheat sheet is uncertain.
Despite the fact that note-based, shift-end charting clearly falls into a gray-zone
where it may or may not be productive (and may actively be counterproductive),
many of the obviously literate, eager and/or confident, and computer-optimistic
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employees informed me that the nurse report/cheat sheet is a job necessity. The
explanation has to do with being able to individually maintain oversight and con-
trol of a large amount of data which one has little or no time to organize. Because
of the need to contain information in one place until it can be copied to multiple
other locations, it is easy to understand why most nursing staff are so opposed
to giving up the cheat sheet. The cheat sheet not only serves as a memory jog
for information that will be charted or discussed during the nurse meeting, but it
also helps individuals who are less skilled in written communication avoid embar-
rassment. One factor that may make the cheat sheet seem less important than is
indicated by the role it plays is that the cheat sheet is technically only used to or-
ganize the plan of care for a patient and is therefore not part of the official record.
Of course, while it is not part of the official record, it may contain information
that needs to be officially recorded. The main nurse report/cheat sheet remains
active for 24-hours before new copies are made and distributed. The cheat sheets
are not a location for copying patient narratives or other lengthy commentary and,
as such, could be easily replaced by an electronic device that allowed for basic in-
put. If the nursing staff had bedside charting or even PDA access to input numbers
throughout the shift, these cheat sheets would not be necessary, nor would the risk
of multiple versions be a problem. When information must be duplicated from
multiple individual sheets onto one sheet, the duplication process represents un-
productive redundancy. The explanation mirrors that used to explain why copying
the medication order to multiple other forms represents unproductive redundancy.
And again, a computerized system that could remove the redundancy related to
duplication could potentially improve the quality and accuracy of the notes avail-
able on the main nurse report/cheat sheet. To support this claim, consider how
one of the pool RNs with experience at a hospital that uses a computerized system
described the nursing cheat sheets as a problem because of the risk of relying on
one that may not have been updated. She explained, “If more than one copy of
a specific sheet exists, then it is relatively certain that at least one copy will not
be updated when others are.” At the hospital with computerized record keeping
she explained, this risk potential was removed because the record was constantly
updated with the most recent information that more traditionally would have been
jotted on an individual nurse cheat sheet. Of course, temporary cheat sheets would
84
be acceptable if only used as memory place holders until the thought could be
recorded in the patient journal. This is equally true whether the cheat sheet or
journal is computerized or paper-based. In other words, the risk of error in this
instance is not due to the fact that the information system is not computerized, but
rather to an organizational flaw in the routines of the paper system that results in
multiple changed copies of the same document. The main cheat sheet that remains
at the HUC’s desk is in theory a constantly updated version of all the cheat sheets.
Even if the practice reflected this, the cheat sheet at the HUC’s desk would still be
an interim step to copying the updated information to the chart and, as discussed,
shift-end charting based on cheat sheet notes represents a gray-zone redundancy
where the price is clear, but the result is variable. Copying first to the cheat sheet,
then to the patient journal introduces a redundancy which is not only inefficient,
but provides an opportunity for error. Charting redundancies where the redundant
effort is individual and not cooperative or where the information can only be con-
firmed and hence checked by the source of the information lead to unproductively
redundant, excess work for nursing staff without the error-reducing benefits of
multiple check-points.
There is currently an interim step between nurse cheat sheets and the patient jour-
nal. This redundant, interim step is the flow sheet, and as one pool CNA’s tes-
timony reveals, the redundant behavior required of the flow sheet begs for error.
She explained the following process: “I write it down on a scrap of paper, walk
to the nurses’ station and transcribe it to the flow sheet. Then I put it in the chart.
Even just treatments like what type of bath they had, for example. I either inform
the nurse or write it down again. Every time you write it down there’s a possibil-
ity of error. The fewer times it’s written and re-written, the better.” Inconsistent
duplications are a risk of this type of unproductive redundancy. If we assume that
the CNA attempts to inform the RN and that one of the two records the information
on their cheat sheet, it is likely that via one of these four sources (the CNA, RN,
or one of their two cheat sheets), the piece of information will be recalled during
nurse report. This makes it a candidate for copying over to the main cheat sheet
and from there into either or both of the flow sheet and the patient journal. Figure
8.1 represents the maze this one piece of information must go through—and the
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Figure 8.1: Information Flow from Start to Finish
pitfalls it must avoid—in order to get to a final and secure resting place in the
patient journal.
As is evident in Figure 8.1, charting redundancies are incorporated into work rou-
tines in the present organizational system at St. Joseph’s. The same information
might be charted in three or more places. At the time of my initial interviews, the
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DON and ECS representative were working together to update the paper charting
routines prior to computer implementation. Additionally, among many of those in-
terviewed, there was the misconception that a computerized system would largely
abolish the inefficiencies of the paper system. This common, but potentially in-
correct viewpoint was that change in and of itself indicated improvement. It is
important that inefficient work practices be identified and removed, rather than
merely reformatted to be doable by computer or any other new twist on the same
organizational processes. In my efforts to identify the inefficiencies and poten-
tial for error within the paper system, I found it useful to clarify what standard
routines exist in principle versus what is done in practice. Such clarity makes it
more obvious what inefficiencies exist in the actual work plan. Again, the cheat
sheets serve as an excellent example. In principle, the standard routine keeps a
constantly updated main cheat sheet at the HUC’s desk. During my observations,
however, I discovered that in practice, individual standard routines rarely involved
updating the main cheat sheet. Therefore, the intended routine is flawed because it
requires unproductively redundant work and the actual routines are more difficult
to trace for errors because they differ from the intended routine.
The intended purpose associated with two additional hospital systems, the Cardex
system and care-plans, are another example of an inconsistency between intended
and actual work routines. The Cardex system is intended to provide a quick fact
reference sheet for each patient, while care-plans and “critical pathways” (Bem-
mel and Musen, 1997, p. 335) are intended to function as a pre-determined plan of
action that may be altered as new information becomes available. The questions
involved in establishing a care-plan include whether or not the patient’s medical
prognosis can improve, if so how, and if not, how might quality of life be made op-
timal during its remainder. Care-plans are often not created prior to treatment, but
rather long into treatment or even at dismissal. Post-care care-plans have no real
purpose, but do fulfill an external administrative requirement. While the Cardex
system and care-plans have different intended purposes, they have apparently be-
come largely indistinguishable due to lack of proper application; but interviewees
were quick to deflect blame from themselves and toward administrative require-
ments.
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Deflection of blame and the impression that administrative paperwork require-
ments are inherently flawed leads back into a discussion of the overlap between
verbal redundancy and written redundancy and how the former can affect qual-
ity or willingness to do the latter. Combating the inclination among St. Joseph’s
nursing staff to prefer verbal communication and the perhaps erroneous belief
that it represents better and safer patient care is a challenge. And while written
documentation is important, the case-specific content of verbal communication
may often be preferable to overly standardized content. It is possible, however,
to physically record information without reducing verbal communication to a se-
ries of less meaningful codes and highly standardized phrases. Rather, Walsh
(2004, p. 1184) explains that the patient’s “narrative” ought to be included in the
medical record in an undistorted form. Coiera and Tombs (1998, p. 674) give an
example of an inefficient and potentially dangerous oral communication that re-
sulted from reliance on verbal exchange only. They describe a situation in which
an important message became hopelessly garbled. The distortion of the message
occurred when a senior team member wanted to transfer a patient and sent the
message via another employee who then failed to communicate it accurately to
the receiving individual. Removing the heavy reliance on memory for shift-end
charting provides an important incentive to reduce extra work such as filling in
administrative details on the admission assessment form and finding other ways
to increase efficiency. This said, it is clear that one of the greatest obstacles to
removing memory-based, shift-end charting is the resistance of nursing staff to
regular, non-verbal reporting. One of the most evident time-sinks I witnessed was
when staff would wait for one another in order to get a question answered about
a patient or whether another employee had done a specific task. This waiting and
wondering resulted in lost time that could have rather been spent formally record-
ing what they themselves had been doing. Communication that does not require
an intermediary party or the presence of both the message giver and receiver offers
great potential for reduction of error and inefficiency.
Consider the popular children’s game of telephone as a simple and familiar exam-
ple of the distortions that can occur in verbal exchanges. A group of children sit
in a circle and whisper a circulating message to the child on their right. When the
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message makes its way around the entire circle and returns to the initial child, the
message is often badly distorted and even sometimes nonsensical. The noisier the
environment in which the game is played and the higher the level of distractions,
the more distorted the message. As has been asserted by the American Hospital
Association concerning IT, distractions and interruptions often result in human
error. Now consider that at St. Joseph’s, nurse report is typically held in the noisy
and public nurse work station. And, given one RN’s estimate that 85% of what
she knows about her patients is received verbally, the likelihood of error due to
distortion is obvious. The emphasis on verbal exchange with colleagues is pre-
sented in a hospital communication study by Coiera and Tombs (1998, p. 675)
where they found that “50% of information came from colleagues, 26% from per-
sonal notes, and 12% from laboratory data.” Assuming that messages given are
in no way distorted due to distractions, consider whether the messages given are
accurate in their initial form. For example, during one nurse report, I noted that
which was said about a specific patient. I then observed the Grand Rounds meet-
ing and observed that the information reported verbally about that specific patient
changed slightly with respect to the time that the last medical problem occurred
during the previous shift. An exact transcript of the change cannot be provided
because patient privacy regulations prevented me from taking notes during Grand
Rounds. Though conveyed verbally and only somewhat distorted, the information
provided at the nurse report was not a precise duplicate. The redundancy of re-
peating the information had a clear purpose given that the doctors had not been
present at the nurse report. This is an example where verbal redundancy actually
mirrors appropriate charting redundancies because in both cases, duplicate infor-
mation is desirable for making sure that the recipient has a full picture without
needing to retrieve information stored elsewhere.
In the preceding example, the RN verbally duplicated written information in order
to present the doctors with a quick overview of their patients. The combination of
written and verbal delivery of the same piece of information meant that the infor-
mation reached more of the medical staff than would likely have occurred if the
information was only available in written form. Because of this clear value and
the limited work effort associated with the redundancy of also delivering the infor-
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mation verbally, this simplified view of the interaction between verbal and written
work argues for its placement at the productive end of the redundancy spectrum.
The price is low and the value is high. The risk of inconsistent duplication is
present, but the consequences are less than if the false duplicate were to be per-
manently recorded in the chart. In a case where information should be duplicated
within the chart, erroneous duplication is problematic because it may be difficult if
not impossible to determine which version is the original and presumably correct
one. In contrast, when information is first written, then duplicated in verbal form,
later questions will be referred back to the original written copy. As a result, any
inconsistencies in the verbal duplication will most likely be short lived. Indeed,
the doctors’ patient knowledge benefited from the RN’s productively redundant
verbal report of that already documented in written form. Moreover, patient jour-
nals are available during Grand Rounds and, though few doctors took advantage
of the opportunity to cross-reference the verbal and written information, the op-
portunity was present. Doctor report and nurse report have similarly productive
value related to conveying information in written form and redundantly in verbal
form.
In contrast to the productive value of some forms of redundantly verbalizing
written information, if medical staff find themselves solely relying on discus-
sion rather than written documentation of patient information, then the oppor-
tunity for inconsistent duplication may present more of a problem than the value
of the verbal duplication. In addition to a preference among nursing staff for
synchronous communication, the challenge of convincing nursing staff that ver-
bal communication is error-prone and does not provide sufficient documentation
nor sufficient productive redundancy is a particularly strong challenge in a small
town. In fact, you may recall that nursing staff attribute the ease of information
flow to St. Joseph’s being such a small facility where everyone is in regular con-
tact with everyone else. As one RN put it, “We’re not a team if we’re not talking”
and as another explained, “Smaller things are more passed on in a verbal report.
The charting isn’t read as much or as important as what we do verbally.” Yet, if
the redundant messages in a verbal report changes even slightly from one shift
change to the next over a 24-hour period, the risk of a distorted message is very
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real. Additionally, there is no “back-up” of verbal communication. The majority
of the RNs, LPNs, and CNAs do not support formal documentation of shift-to-
shift and inter-shift communication. When asked why verbal exchange is prefer-
able, these employees explained that it allows for more human interaction and
discussion, and that their pocket notes are too simplistic (“only memory jogs”),
even “embarrassing” due to incorrect spelling and other errors. In the opinion of
many, transcribing these memory jogs into a note for another employee makes the
note seem more important than is deemed necessary; despite this unwillingness to
write out personal notes because of risk of making them seem too important, the
interviewees maintain that even if inconsequential for the charts, personal notes
ought to be communicated to the next shift. In other words, the communication
is judged to be important, but not so important that it is worth writing a note in-
stead of passing it on verbally. This seems inconsistent and a weak reason for
choosing to convey the message verbally rather than in writing. Staff who have
weak non-verbal communication skills may resist logging details and prefer oral
communication because they feel more confident in their ability to speak and feel
more comfortable exchanging information orally. When information ought to be
recorded, such employees may instead choose to pass it along verbally to an-
other employee which reinforces the tendency and preference within the group
for verbal rather than written communication. Whatever the reason for choosing
to convey messages verbally rather than in writing, the result of preferring verbal
exchange means that some staff are inclined to make memory jogs without any
formal charting until the end of their shift. Most individuals indicated that this
results in lost details. The loss of small details across individual cheat sheets may
compound into greater losses in the overall communication about a given patient.
The most common thread across the redundancy spectrum is that of whether or
not the redundant work requires redundant thinking or speaking, or whether the
redundant work involves redundant writing. Both redundant thinking and speak-
ing seem most often to increase the likelihood that an error of faulty opinion is
caught. For example, discussions at nurse report and Grand Rounds provide an
opportunity to rethink and discuss patient results and needs. Even note-based,
shift-end charting may have an element of protecting against errors built into
91
the redundancy—rephrasing from one’s own shorthand requires actively think-
ing about the information. To recap, rethinking notes and orally communicat-
ing written work are both examples of potentially productive redundancies. In
contrast, written duplication of already written information provides an opportu-
nity for inconsistent duplication. Therefore, written duplication of already written
information represents a clearly unproductive or even counterproductive type of
redundancy. It will be crucial that St. Joseph’s administration attempt to alter
unproductive redundancies and retrain staff to the importance of those changes
before it will be possible to move to a new computer-based system. Chapter 9
offers an overview of how changes might be made to the current system, as well
as how a new system might most effectively be introduced.
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Chapter 9
Changing Work Routines
In Chapter 8 work routines at St. Joseph’s were analyzed to identify redundancies
and to determine the value of the redundancies found. Some of the redundancies
were deemed productive and in as much, important to keep in any reorganization.
Other redundancies were deemed gray-zone redundancies and varied from rela-
tively useful to relatively useless. Finally there were unproductive redundancies
which in theory ought to be removed during the process of reorganization of the
work routines and information systems at St. Joseph’s. Unfortunately, while the
choices of which routines to keep and which to disgard may seem obvious if based
solely on the discussion in Chapter 8, the decision to remove a redundancy is in
fact more complicated. Various tasks make up work routines and between starting
and finishing a given work routine, individual tasks involved in its completion may
overlap or interact with tasks associated with a different work routine. Together
the many task chains at St. Joseph’s make up the “production lattice” (Gasser,
1986, p. 210). As a result of the interactions or overlap that may occur between
task chains, changing a work routine rarely affects only that work routine. This
means that it is important to provide a greater understanding of the potential for
unintended consequences. To provide this understanding, it is useful to look more
closely at a couple of the examples discussed in Chapter 8.
The task chains in Chapter 7.3.1 represent intended work routines at St. Joseph’s.
The task represented in Figure 8.1 involves the transcription of one piece of in-
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formation to multiple locations; in this figure the intended routines are shown to-
gether with the many uncertainties that develop between the start and finish of the
task chain. Gasser (1986, p. 210) writes, “In any particular instance, the precise
structure of the task chain is unpredictable, because it depends upon the contin-
gencies of the work process, including intersecting task chains.” In contrast, if
this task chain were standardized via a computerized system, perhaps the produc-
tive redundancy associated with re-thinking and reformulating the note contents
would be maintained, while the unproductive redundancy of creating multiple du-
plications of the reformulated information would be unnecessary due to comput-
erized duplication. If such a computer-based standardization were to occur, the
task chains should look much the same from one occurrence of the task to the
next. Secondly, standardized tasks ought to maintain the productive redundancy
revealed in the medication order process, but minus the instances where indepen-
dent workers actually re-do one another’s work. In other words, where human
error risk is a high concern, it makes sense to standardize cooperative review of
information. Finally, if the production lattice is restructured and unproductive
or unnecessarily overlapping (inefficient) work tasks are removed, actors may or
may not adjust to these new and more efficient standardized routines. Moreover,
altering tasks inevitably alters more than that which is intended.
9.1 Standardizing Routines
The redundancy spectrum (productive, gray-zone, unproductive) described in Chap-
ter 8 provided criteria and case study specific examples of each of the three cat-
egories along the spectrum (Table 8.1). In theory all unproductive redundancies
ought to be altered in order to make the hospital more productive; the examples of
unproductive redundancy that were explicitly provided in Chapter 8 are admission
paperwork, the medication ordering process, and the duplication of cheat sheets.
Despite the fact that these unproductive redundancies ought to be altered in the-
ory, changing work routines is risky because one alteration may cause unforeseen
or unwanted effects to other work routines; Ash et al. (2004, p. 105) write, “We
frequently observed instances in which the intended strengthening of one link in
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the chain of care actually leads unwittingly to a deletion or weakening of others.”
Therefore, it is worthwhile to establish a change spectrum that identifies the dif-
ficulty associated with implementing a given change, as well as the value of the
result, and any likely impact that change may have on other work routines. Impact
on other work routines can range from minimal to high impact. It tends to be that
the easier the change, the lesser the results and impacts on other routines; it is once
again useful to think in terms of whether the price paid (in terms of work efforts
necessary to change old routines) is balanced by the results achieved. While my
research indicates that easier changes will tend to have lesser results, Berg (1999,
p. 394) explains that, “The more powerful the coordinating activities of the arti-
fact, the more the work of medical personnel has to change to be changed.” Table
9.1 shows the change spectrum categories by difficulty level, results, and potential
impact on other work routines in the production lattice. Examples of routines that
correspond to the different difficulty categories are noted as well.
The original timeline (Figure 7.1) for ECS introduction was based on an evolu-
tionary approach. First, the admissions assessment form was to be electronically
implemented. Following this, other elements of the admissions process were to be
electronically implemented. When this timeline was established, it was presumed
that it would be possible to interconnect the existing Dairyland softare with Amer-
ican Data’s ECS. Recall that hospital administration and the ECS liaison both cite
interconnection problems as one of the reasons ECS development was postponed.
While fixing communication between Dairyland and ECS would have eliminated
Difficulty Level Expected Results Routines to be Changed
Easy
small change phone services
minimal impact
Challenging
variable change admission paperwork
variable impact
Difficult
significant change ordering medications
high impact duplicating cheat sheets
Table 9.1: Change Difficulty Spectrum
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the redundancy of duplicating information already on the Face-Sheet, in general,
problems in the current system must be sorted out before there is any point in
choosing a new system. If the same poorly patterned work flaws are introduced
into a new system, they may become standards in that system as well and the
new system may be no more efficient than the previous one. This is one rea-
son why it made sense that interconnection problems between Dairyland and ECS
were regarded as a true barrier to progress rather than as a situation that could be
worked-around. Be reminded of Bemmel and Musen’s (1997, p. 331) comment
that “Computers are a means to an end and not an end in themselves.” When the
task chains are sorted out, standardized, and generally made more effective and
safe, then is the appropriate time to introduce an entirely new information system
into the hospital. In the case of St. Joseph’s, when the time is appropriate, that
new information system will be a computerized one with the hopes that the paper
one will become obsolete.
Many members of the nursing staff independently informed me that their aware-
ness of redundancy and the value of greater standardization increased when ad-
ministration began to push for a new and computerized information system. Even
the most change-resistant staff indicated that they would prefer using a comput-
erized system if it could simplify the admissions process or any number of other
work routines such that each piece of patient data could be input one time rather
than recurring times. Many staff indicated that they are less careful and more
prone to leave out details when they tell or record a piece of information for the
second and third times. As discussed, routines incorporated into a computerized IS
could be standardized in such a way that human-made duplications were no longer
necessary. Even when employees understood that a computerized IS offered such
benefits, the fear of using a computer system for admission paperwork was still
lower than for using it in clinical paperwork. There seem to be two primary rea-
sons for this. The first reason is the fact that all nursing staff are used to printing
some information from Dairyland when the front desk is closed. Therefore, a part
of the admissions process is already computerized which likely makes it less in-
timidating to computerize yet more of the admissions process. The second reason
is that a mistake made in the clinical paperwork is more likely to have a serious
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consequence than is a mistake made in administrative or admissions paperwork.
This means that there is a higher resistance to using an unknown system to com-
plete clinical work than for using an unknown system to complete administrative
work.
Easy Change Installing a computerized switchboard menu on the telephones
at St. Joseph’s is one example of an easy change that would have a minimal im-
pact on work routines not related to nurse report. The cost or efforts required to
make the change would be technical and human. The technical cost would in-
clude building a menu into the phone system while the human cost would be the
required learning curve of staff calling within the hospital or others calling into
the hospital. Encountering a computerized menu is common and requires very
little of the human component. The value returned includes decreasing stress and
noise at nurse report and in general at the nurse work station. Additionally, a side
benefit might be that any exposure to positive technology-based improvements
might have the benefit of reducing overall anxiety about other hi-tech behaviors.
Compared to the expected value return, it seems that this change is relatively easy
and not too costly to implement.
Challenging Change The unproductive redundancies of the admissions pro-
cess occur in isolation from other paperwork that occurs throughout the patient
stay. For this reason, it seems logical to electronically implement the sequence
of work routines for the admissions process in one stage and to do so prior to
implementing any other sequences of work routines. The implementation of a re-
vised admissions process might be done in a single stage together with all other
changes to the work routines so that everything was functional from the first day;
or one work routine after another could be implemented until all those associated
with the admissions process were in place. The first approach can be referred to
as implementing the change dramatically while the second approach refers to a
more evolutionary approach to change. In the case of the admissions paperwork it
seems that the dramatic change approach is preferable to the evolutionary change
approach. There are several reasons for this opinion. For starters, even though
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the front desk uses Dairyland, if ECS and Dairyland were able to properly inter-
connect with one another, then only the RNs would need to be involved in the
admissions process. This would mean that only the seventeen RNs would need
to be trained, rather than having to train them as well as having to train the front
desk staff how to import or provide Dairyland information to the RNs. Another
reason that it would be preferable to change the admissions process all at once
is that the very reason for changing the routines associated with the admissions
process is that they require duplication. If only the admissions assessment form
were to be electronically implemented while the rest of the admissions paperwork
remained paper-based, the RNs would actually have an increased work load. They
would have to log into a computer to complete the admissions assessment and
then copy from the screen or a print-out to the other forms. The routines would
be exactly the same as previous to electronic implementation of the assessment
form except that now the admitting RN would require two tools (computer and
paper) for an admission rather than just one. Even though this period would be
short-lived, it would temporarily increase the time spent on the admissions paper-
work. In contrast, if the entire process were computerized at one time, the work
routines would be changed in the process because the computer would take care
of duplications; and as a result, the element of unproductive redundancy would no
longer be present. Another reason that it makes sense to start with the admissions
process separate from other areas of work that will eventually need to be revised
is that the RNs have authority and leadership over the rest of the nursing staff. It
seems that there would be a social incentive for the other employees to follow
the initiative of the RNs. Furthermore, because the RNs are responsible for the
admissions process and they only constitute about half of the total nursing staff,
the price in terms of time and effort to make the change would be limited to the
need to train half the staff; yet the results would involve speeding the process for
all new patients. Finally, because the admissions process occurs in isolation, once
it is completed, this set of routines should not require revisiting in order to change
other work routines. Therefore, if change is made dramatically rather than routine
by routine, the changed admissions process will have a relatively minor impact
on other work routines. In contrast, if changes to the admissions paperwork occur
one by one, each change will result in changes to the remaining paper-based ad-
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missions routines. As a result, a slow or evolutionary change process is likely to
have higher associated costs than if the whole process is changed dramatically.
Difficult Change In contrast to the efforts to change the admissions process,
changing the process for ordering medication seems likely to be far more diffi-
cult, though it is also more important and a successful change would be more
rewarding; the price in terms of time and effort to make the change is higher than
for changing the admissions process and it also potentially involves changing rou-
tines for most of the staff since everyone from the physician to an RN or LPN and
the HUC might be involved in the task chain. Moreover, medication orders are
neither isolated in time nor do they follow one standard set of routines. Rather,
the routines for prescribing medicine may change or involve different actors de-
pending on the time of day, who is present, and whether the order represents an
entirely new order or a change in a previous one (refer to Figure 7.6). While the
admissions paperwork involves a standard and isolated set of routines from one
admission to the next, medication order paperwork is not isolated; whereas the
routines involved in the admissions paperwork only interacted with other routines
in the production lattice at the start and finish of the admissions paperwork task
chain, many of the tasks in the medication order task chain interact with routines
related to other tasks in the production lattice. Clearly the cost and difficulty as-
sociated with changing the processes for ordering medications is greater than the
cost of changing admissions paperwork. The higher cost does, however, seem
correlated to a higher value return. The admissions paperwork is unproductively
redundant and could certainly benefit from using information technology to sim-
plify the work routines, but despite the clear benefit, errors related to unproductive
redundancy in the admissions paperwork are less likely to be clinically relevant
and therefore are lower risk. In contrast, errors related to medical orders paper-
work are potentially far more serious. It seems that medical orders paperwork
would benefit from being more isolated both in time and by group of involved
employees. For example, it seems that it would be beneficial if the medicine or-
der paperwork process could be divided into the doctor’s order (whether new or
a changed order) and nurse signature. If the doctor’s order were electronically
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input, when the nurse reviewed the order, the order could then be automatically
updated in the patient journal, on the MAR, and on the pharmacy order.
The duplication of cheat sheets is another example of a work routine that will be
difficult to change. Removing the unproductive redundancy of human duplication
of cheat sheets is likely to have a high impact on other tasks because it ought to
ensure that new information is quickly and directly relayed to other cheat sheets
and that information from one sheet to another is consistent. The likely net effect
is a quality improvement in patient care. While the benefits of having exact rather
than inconsistent duplications are clear, the cost or efforts required to remove
human duplication of cheat sheets are heavy for both the human and technical
components of the information system. Financial resources are limited and yet
one of the only ways to keep the threshold low enough that nursing staff would
be willing to make the switch to electronic cheat sheets would be if accessibility
to an electronic tool were equal to that of a pen and paper. Also, being able to
record information in a familiar way (for example, by hand writing onto the screen
of a PDA) would likely be a great incentive for nursing staff to adopt the new
technology. In addition to accessibility, even if the new technology is similarly
sized and kept in the pocket like the old technology, staff resistance is likely to
be high. The reasons to expect high staff resistance are discussed in Chapters
7.3.1 and 8; these reasons include fears about information loss and inadequate
computer skills, as well as feelings of insecurity about the quality of the notes and
an objection to saving the notes for others to see and potentially judge.
Gaining the cooperation of nursing staff to change the inefficiencies and unpro-
ductive routines in the production lattice may be aided by practicing the principles
of socio-technical and participatory design. The socio-technical view (Akrich,
1992) that only some work should be delegated to the machine and some to the
human actors might be compared to delegation of work to the written records of
the information system as opposed to the verbal flow of information that is pre-
ferred by nurses. In the same way that the spouse of an avid computer-user might
eventually recognize that a word-processing program is better for long documents
than a pen and pencil, so too nurses might eventually adopt the new technology
or altered information system for their nursing communication if it is seen to be a
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clear improvement over the old system. The problem now for St. Joseph’s nurses
is that there is no clear benefit to be gained by adopting a new system, even if er-
ror statistics do reveal that the existing system is more error prone than alternative
options.
Scandinavian healthcare operates on the principles of participatory design or in-
dustrial democracy. Rather than convincing the user of the attributes of the new
system, the user is herself involved in designing the new system. The opportunity
to provide personal input and a feeling of ownership over the final product aid
the user in accepting what becomes the new standard. Rather than the product-
oriented view, this user-centered emphasis addresses the issues that are most likely
to “accommodate learning and communication” (Ehn, 1993, p. 61). Indeed, at
St. Joseph’s the best source of information about what changes, tools, and train-
ing could best help nursing staff adapt their routines came from the nursing staff
themselves. Including them in the decision making and change process was an ad-
vantage for both them and administration. Ethnographically collected data about
job routines and hospital task chains at St. Joseph’s provided employee insights
into current employee problems and unproductively redundant work routines or
data loss due to forgotten notes or non-documented verbal reporting. In keep-
ing with participatory design, this ethnographic study should involve the future
users in the design of the future system, while simultaneously using the bene-
fits of medical error research to introduce more thorough documentation. In the
case of St. Joseph’s, it seems that more thorough documentation may be achieved
without increasing workload, but rather by changing work routines to eliminate
the unproductive redundancies. Participatory design of a new information system
ought to aid in achieving this goal of increasing beneficial documentation while
not increasing employee workload. Throughout this discussion, the quality of the
technology available and the ways in which it would be taken into use has played
a significant role in the assumptions about the difficulty associated with chang-
ing work and standardizing routines. Chapter 9.2 describes the attributes desired
in a computerized system as well as the training needs identified by current St.
Joseph’s nurses to be used by them and others in the future.
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9.2 Computerized IS Development and Training
As with altering unproductively redundant or error-causing work routines, de-
cisions about staff training will have results that influence not only the training
sessions and quality of education, but also whether employees readily accept or
actively resist technical aspects of the new system. Even when employees ob-
jectively recognize that they will benefit from changing a specific work routine,
a lack of proper training may mean that they do not adopt the recommended be-
haviors by which that work routine is changed. For example, being required to
electronically record information might be more intimidating than the perception
of benefit from the change might be encouraging.
As of early summer 2006, St. Joseph’s remains undecided about whether they
will continue forward with the ECS product from American Data. Despite this
fact, ECS remains the product for which the training and system development sug-
gestions were made during my interviews. While both concerns and suggestions
surfaced regarding ECS or introduction of any other computerized IS, suggestions
specific to the employee-program interface were more difficult to attain because,
of course, the majority of employees had no visual concept of the system. Despite
administrative distribution of information via multiple communication channels,
many staff members were unaware that ECS (or another computerized IS) would
be introduced. Some of these members were of the opinion that they, as the users,
should have had a more clear opportunity to share their thoughts and suggestions
prior to the administrative decision to make so drastic a change. While staff that
actively participated in the ECS viewing may have self-selected at the staff meet-
ing, other potentially valuable sources of input did not. Regardless of their reason
for opting out, their input and participation may be crucial to successful imple-
mentation. Also, even if the employees are themselves at fault for not having
been better informed, it is necessary to ensure that this inconsistent pattern of
knowledge and participation is remedied.
An early and important step would be for administration to formulate a few spe-
cific and minimally controversial reasons that change is needed, as well as to ex-
plain what it means to be a beta-site, addressing the positive aspects (tailored sys-
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tem), as well as the negative (potentially long wait time, interim inconveniences,
etc.). About a quarter of the nursing staff told me that “computers are the way
of the future” and that that alone necessitates change from a paper-based IS to a
computerized one. When the going gets tough, this early willingness to cooperate
and go with the flow will be compromised by the fact that the users do not have
a solid reason to support this “way of the future.” So, in addition to formulating
specific reasons for needed change, it is worthwhile to give specific examples of
successes that followed the introduction of such systems. Recall, for example,
that the nursing home at St. Joseph’s had a reduction from dozens to zero citations
following the introduction of ECS. Of course, of most relevance to an intimidated
employee is understanding how this improvement and reduction of error will di-
rectly affect and aid them, and how they can achieve a system wherein positive
benefits outweigh the early frustrations.
One important strategy would be to not allow stragglers. To avoid this, workers
might be lumped into groups in which members are familiar with one another dur-
ing training of non-job specific tasks. For example, RNs and LPNs work closely, so
to better utilize this easier exchange of information and sympathetic understand-
ing that familiarity engenders, LPNs could be included in the pre-training stages of
what will lead into the solely RN training for implementation of the “clinical” or
“assessment tool.” The same holds for CNAs. Indeed, an often voiced opinion was
that, “We believe our own.” If ECS is chosen, it might be wise for administration to
utilize this by emphasizing Carmen Zirbel’s nursing credentials, as well as having
someone from St. Joseph’s nursing home or from another hospital talk about the
process of converting from paper to computer charts. However, because of mixed
views about ECS in the nursing home, as well as fears about how ECS may be
altered and made applicable to a hospital setting, it might be better to have some-
one consult from a different hospital. Among the pre-training options, there could
be a course titled “Introduction to using a computer” in which basic computer
skills are introduced. For example, a basic course could cover skills such as turn-
ing on the computer, mouse/spatial skills, logging into the computer, and logging
into a mock ECS (or some other specified program). A typing course is another
pre-training measure that had tremendous support and is definitely needed.
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To collect training suggestions, I opted to encourage imagination, rather than to
play by the rules of reality imposed by restricted resources (time, money, and
number of staff). By encouraging freedom to suggest outside of what was “re-
alistic” or “practical,” I collected a number of ideas that might be feasible under
the limitations that actually do exist. Suggestions deemed necessary included
small group training as opposed to en mass training, with weight on supervised
opportunity to practice. For this reason, training ought to occur in a computer
equipped room, with only one student per machine. The hospital plans to use
its “library” room which was established via one part of a $60,000 grant from
the National Library of Medicare, and which provides the hospital with an audio-
visual classroom/library, useful for both in-house training and for distance learn-
ing (St. Joseph’s Community Health Services, 2006). In addition to having small
groups, many staff favored self-placement in ability-based groups. While there
were some that preferred mixed-ability groups, they were okay with ability-based
groups, whereas those preferring ability-based groups were not okay with mixed
groups. In brainstorming with interviewees about how they could know what
group suited them for self-placement, interviewees preferred self-selection based
on a breakdown of where each group will start and what one’s user skills ought
to be to take part in that group. The most timid users were concerned that they
would be permitted too little time to master the skills during the course, while
the most advanced users were concerned that without ability-based groups, they
might have to devote more time than was required to the learning process. A bal-
anced perspective was that in non-ability-based groups the advanced users could
help the less advanced. But, while this plays to the idea of inter-group trust and
diminished discomfort when supported by co-workers, there were barriers to this
approach. During the pre-training period, the added cost of financing multiple
slow-paced groups is one clear barrier, since the agreement with ECS does not
include training for basic computer and keyboarding skills. A less frequently
mentioned barrier was expressed by the few for whom hierarchical confrontations
posed a clear social problem on the job; keeping in mind that computer talent was
very correlated to age, for these employees with job-related social hierarchy is-
sues, there was a threat involved in acknowledging a professional weakness that
could be taught to them by their professional hierarchical inferiors. However, de-
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spite a general preference for ability-based groups, there was almost unanimous
support for pre-training a select group that would be available for one-on-one sup-
port on the floor during the first week of implementation. The emphasis here was
on the “familiar face” and the familiarity of the trainers with the environment and
staff. The difficulty with achieving this is that St. Joseph’s is a small hospital and
this would require that the pre-training group not be on hospital-duty, but only
on tech-support duty for that week. The suggestion that there be a tech-support
trained group to help others during their regular shifts was politely dismissed due
to a feeling of pressing inability to complete those tasks which already are re-
quired during one’s shift. Training specific suggestions are summarized in Table
9.2.
These suggestions are based on user familiarity (and in some cases, dissatisfac-
tion) with either St. Joseph’s nursing home ECS software and/or charting software
at another facility; recall that at the time that these interviews were conducted, I
had not yet seen the ECS software. Carmen Zirbel shared my opinion that con-
ducting the interviews prior to seeing the software was advantageous because I
would be more inclined to keep an open mind. That said, after compiling initial
suggestions, one of my interviewees demonstrated for me the Nursing Home’s
ECS software. Following that demonstration, the suggestions I had received fell
into context as did my own reservations, as well as recommendations for poten-
tial methods to strengthen the system. Even so, the demonstration to which I was
privy was short and, because of HIPAA rules, I was unable to do the self-clicking
that I would have needed to have a more intuitive experience with the software.
Therefore, some of the suggestions I received were general concerns voiced by
employees about software problems they have encountered elsewhere. For exam-
Training Suggestions
basic computer skills course
typing course
training in small groups
ability-based groups
group self-selection
Table 9.2: Training Suggestions
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ple, some expressed concern about screen readability and program consistency.
For screen readability, one user complained that while vertical scrolling is fine
when it is necessary, horizontal scrolling or a combination of the two makes it
difficult to comfortably read charts. Consistency was a more prevalent concern;
users repeatedly gave the example of 24-hour time being less prone to error than
12-hour time, and therefore requested that the program only permit 24-hour time
entries. One commonly mentioned concern was that related to the differences
between a nursing home and acute care. Indeed, many adaptations would be re-
quired to move ECS from the long term healthcare setting of a nursing home to the
short term, high turnover of a CAH. For example, while the nursing home has a
list of all patients, such a list will likely not be sufficient in the hospital due to the
high turnover rate. Ideally, American Data would respond to different user pref-
erences and learning tendencies by organizing access to individual patient charts
by either a list of patient names, or a list of room numbers. The two could be
cross-referenced.
Other system specific suggestions included limiting the number of ECS screen but-
tons to those that are necessary at all times, as well as providing more information
about what the buttons do, and more descriptive names of options in the drop-
down lists. Additional information can be provided in non-cluttering ways, such
as making the buttons larger, with writing on them, and with mouse rollover for
a longer explanation. The buttons ought to be designed according to educational
principles, as it is indeed the responsibility of the designer to impart use to the
user. In fact, what I found in the users that were familiar with ECS was that these
users do the exact same processes over and over, but find that they are confused
and unable to proceed when there is something even remotely new. In short, the
program seems unintuitive.
Some additional system specific suggestions included making ECS appear more
like the leading tabular system that is used by hospitals across the United States.
While ECS does use a tab system, the orientation and color of the tabs is different
than in the paper charts used across the US, which if the program is first going
to resemble/draw on traditional organizational techniques, it ought to do so more
overtly, and thereby take advantage of the already established comfort with the
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organizational layout. For example, rather than the unintuitive use of MS-DOS and
other non-HCI focused software that characterized the industry until the 1970s
(Elsom-Cook, 2001, pp. 83,122), Microsoft capitalized on the idea of creating a
virtual desktop with actions represented by visual icons with which the user al-
ready had an established association. In keeping with this type of intuitive design,
I recommended to Carmen Zirbel that American Data consider basing some of
the ECS visual features on pre-established systems at St. Joseph’s; for example,
there is a culture of color-coding commentary on paper charts such that doctors’
notes are in red and nurse notes in blue. While ECS was resistant to the idea
that their tabular system was not taking full advantage of an already established
learning curve by using a similar orientation and color scheme on the tabs, ECS
was very receptive to the idea of color-coding commentary, as a carry-over vi-
sual clue from paper charting. While the electronic system should not merely by
a replication of the paper system, it makes little sense to intentionally do away
with convenient, established/learned techniques where the organizational systems
are nonetheless similar. It should be possible to use simple technology to lure
technophobes into the program without being so simplistic that the paper is merely
replaced by the technology, or that the user is confused or underestimated (Tog-
nazzini, 1992, p. 12). Of course, to balance this perspective, it is important to
remember that learning should not replace actual doing (Ciborra, 1997, p. 111).
A carry over complaint from Dairyland logins at the front desk computer resulted
in specific requests that ECS limit both initial and repeated login steps. Biometric
techniques exist and are used in other hospitals, and could be a future possibil-
ity at St. Joseph’s. Table 9.3 shows a summary of employee suggestions for the
computerized IS interface.
Interface Suggestions
vertical, not horizontal scrolling
24-hour time
limited login steps
color coded tabs
clear exit button
patient charts organized by name and room
Table 9.3: Interface Suggestions
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
Information systems may generally be described as the organization of a web of
task chains into a functional production lattice, where the specific tasks chains
may be industry or company specific. This interweaving of task chains requires
“collaborative interaction” to coordinate multiple human and non-human actors
(Suchman and Trigg, 1991, p. 73). Effective coordination is essential to limit-
ing inefficiencies and unnecesary redundancies, and requires inbuilt prevention
against human-related errors. When an information system is not performing in
the way desired, it may be necessary to reorganize work routines or even fun-
damentally shift the artifacts available to the human elements of the production
lattice. Inefficiencies and the need to re-design information systems are problems
evident in most any organization where there exists a need for real-time commu-
nication flow, coordinated human activity, and processing of the communicated
information. Via literature review and a case study that may be generalized to the
larger problem area, this thesis offers suggestions for how to identify unproduc-
tive inefficiencies and potential areas for human-related error, how to then decide
which of the identified unproductive inefficiencies are to be removed, and finally,
how to go about enacting change to the work routines and coordination of the
human component.
While mistakes are undesirable in any line of work, in certain industries mistakes
are dangerous and even deadly; and it is essential that risk of error be made as
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minimal as possible. Competent practice occurs when error potential is mini-
mized, and work routines are no longer inefficient and cumbersome but simple
and straightforward. Of course, some inefficiencies may be maintained in order
to increase the number of check-points that critical information must pass through
before that information is considered safe for use. One answer for how to iden-
tify unproductive inefficiencies and error potential is to use an ethnographic study
(Schultze, 2000) that allows human input and brings the designer closer to those
who do or will use an artifact (Suchman and Trigg, 1991, p. 74). By conduct-
ing an ethnographic study, problems due to the difference between standards and
practice—or even a lack of standards—may become apparent where they are cur-
rently overlooked. And by allowing individual actors in the production lattice to
provide insight into the routines in which they are involved and coordinate with
others, it should be possible to make adjustments so that roles and routines are
modified to better complement one another (Akrich, 1992). If this reshaping pro-
cess is successful, then coordination between actors should improve.
Suchman and Trigg (1991, p. 73) explain that “work practice is fundamentally so-
cial,” and “This basic sociality recommends that wherever we go we look for the
human interactions that make up the work and define what counts as competent
practice.” It therefore follows that the social element of work interactions is an in-
nate and implicit element of coordinated work routines, and an important element
to consider before enacting changes. Any new information system that attempts
to remove or possibly even limit social interaction is therefore unsound. Further-
more, it invites failure as it requires those whose work is being reorganized to give
too much to ensure the success of something with which they are not yet familiar.
Moreover, social interaction that is accompanied by individual work may actually
aid information flow by offering multiple communication channels and increased
opportunity to discuss and recognize potential problems. Then when inefficien-
cies are identified and a reorganizational process is undertaken to remove them, it
is essential that the source of the organizational problems is actually that which is
removed (Hartswood et al., 2003, p. 241). The subsequent effect that removal may
have on other work routines is ideally recognized and taken into consideration be-
fore changes are made so that a negative domino effect might be thwarted. Once
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apparent problem routines are identified, then a plan for how to enact change must
be determined.
This thesis proposes that inefficiencies be classified by degree of inefficiency, by
how easily they can be modified or removed, and the likelihood that an inefficiency
can be improved. When these aspects are evaluated together, either they will
indicate a positive return of value (measured by intended and desireable change)
or they will not. At that point it might then be wise to take advantage of the
intrinsic human social drive by introducing change to one group of workers and,
once that change achieves acceptance and use within that group, to introduce the
change to other groups as well (Orlikowski, 1992, p. 369). This research might
be extended in the future to examine how workers’ innate social drives affect
their incentives for relaying information, and specifically how individual notes
and cheat sheets are either excluded from the information system or are included
in some revised or reformatted manner.
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